This analyis was prepared by the Public International Law & Policy Group

The arguments surrounding the recent Application for an Issuance of an Arrest Warrant by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for President Al Bashir of Sudan for crimes against humanity and genocide demonstrate the prevalence of myths regarding the role of justice in the peace process.  In anticipation of a ruling on the Application for the Issuance of an Arrest Warrant for Al Bashir[1] (the Application) some within the international community asserted that the Application will both inflame violence and undermine efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the Sudan conflict.  Further, several common objections to the Application perpetuate procedural myths about the process of securing an arrest warrant as well as the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Four of the myths created by these arguments regarding the role of justice in the peace process in Darfur are discussed below.

Myth #1: The Application for the Issuance of an Arrest Warrant is Based on Ten Pages of Evidence.

Reality: The Ten Page Application Is a Summary of the Evidence That was Presented to a Panel of Three Judges.

Prior to seeking the Issuance of an Arrest Warrant, the ICC Prosecutor collected evidence from 105 missions in eighteen different states.  This evidence included eyewitness and victim statements, interviews of Sudanese officials, reports from both the United Nations’ (UN) Commission of Inquiry and the Sudanese National Commission of Inquiry, as well as materials from open sources.  This evidence was made available to the three-judge panel of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.  The ten-page document ultimately submitted represents only a summary of the evidence collected.

After the Prosecutor’s Application, a three-judge panel reviews the evidence presented to determine if it is sufficient to issue an arrest warrant.  Since 2003, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has filed twelve applications for the Issuance of an Arrest Warrant, all of which have been accepted and issued by the panel of judges. 

Myth #2: The ICC Does Not Have Clear Jurisdiction in Sudan.

Reality: The UN Charter, UN Security Council Resolution 1593, and the Treaty Bringing the ICC Into Force All Provide a Clear Jurisdictional Basis for ICC Involvement in Sudan.

The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides that it may exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression if, “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”[2]

On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1593 referring the situation in Sudan to the ICC.  The resolution formally decides, “to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.”[3]  This resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is binding on all member states of the UN – including Sudan.  

The ICC statute provides for complementarity, which allows states to retain jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity unless the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute alleged crimes.[4]  In the situation of Sudan, the ICC sanctioned the Issuance of an Arrest Warrant for several Sudanese citizens located in Sudan.  To date, the Sudanese government has refused to comply with the arrest warrants, and has not considered appropriate domestic mechanisms.  In fact, Mr. Ahmed Haroun, who is sought by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Darfur, currently holds the position of Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs and is responsible for delivering humanitarian aid to Darfur. 

The ICC has a clear jurisdictional mandate for action in Sudan.  The Sudanese government has remained unwilling to genuinely investigate and prosecute alleged international crimes occurring in Darfur.  As a result of this inaction the UN Security Council referred the situation of Darfur to the ICC.  The power of the UN Security Council to issue such a referral is established in the Rome Statute and is binding on all states, including Sudan. 

Myth #3: The ICC Undermines the Sovereignty of African States.

Reality: The Treaty Establishing the ICC Was Signed by 106 States, Including Thirty African States.  Three of the Four Matters Currently Before the Court Were Referred by African States.

Thirty African states, including Kenya, Chad, Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, and Liberia have ratified the statute of the ICC.  In August, President Museveni of Uganda, declared that he does not “condemn” the Application, and believes that ignoring Al Bashir’s criminal liability simply because he is president would “be ignoring the right of the victims.”[5]

The ICC has investigations in several states in Africa at the request of the African governments.  The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government of Uganda, and the government of the Central African Republic have all requested that the Prosecutor of the ICC investigate alleged crimes occurring in their states. As a result, the ICC agreed to assume jurisdiction in the following instances.  In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ICC assumed jurisdiction to investigate whether crimes had been committed within the country by paramilitary organizations.  The ICC assumed jurisdiction in Uganda when the Government requested the prosecutor to investigate the Lord’s Resistance Army’s actions in Uganda.  The Government of the Central African Republic also requested the Prosecutor investigate whether crimes had been committed on its territory.  These African governments support the ICC action in their respective countries.  

While the government of Sudan did not itself refer the action to the ICC in a manner similar to other African states, the ICC assumed jurisdiction over the conflict in Darfur after the UN Security Council, under the authority granted to it by Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, referred the situation to the ICC in 2005.  This form of jurisdiction is clearly articulated in the Statute.  Further, this request has been strongly supported by many citizens of Sudan such as Darfuri victims, as well as by African civil society organizations, and by some African governments.  In recent weeks the Omdas (Darfuri leaders) of the Goz-Amir refugee camp in Chad, which shelters more than 19,000 Darfuri refugees,[6] sent a letter to the ICC voicing their support of the Prosector’s Application and called for his “immediate” arrest.[7]  A poll conducted by the Arab television station Al-Jazeera TV found that fifty-two percent of Arab respondents “support having their leaders face international justice” mechanisms like the ICC.[8]  Darfuri rebel groups, unsurprisingly, also support the Application.[9]  As noted above, Ugandan President Museveni recently recognized the rights of victims in Darfur.[10]

With three African states already referring matters to the ICC for resolution, as well as the support of some African governments and many civil society organizations for the ICC, the ICC does not unjustifiably undermine the sovereignty of Sudan.  Rather, the ICC and this Application enforces the rights of African citizens and victims of the Darfur conflict.

Myth #4: The Issuance of an Arrest Warrant for Al Bashir will Lead to More Violence in Darfur.

Reality: Though the Violence in Darfur may Continue, It Is Not Clearly Caused by the Issuance of an Arrest Warrant.

As explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, even though there is a risk to increased violence, there cannot be a lasting peace in Sudan without justice.[11]  The introduction of justice may change the dynamic so that the peace process is taken more seriously by Sudan.  Dr. Paul Williams has argued, “The indictment of Bashir and Sudan is actually a positive step in the peace process, because it will clarify the nature of the conflict.”[12]  John Prendergrast of Enough agrees saying, “The status quo in Sudan is one of the deadliest in the world.  Until there is a consequence for the commission of genocide, it will continue.  This action introduces a cost, finally, into the equation.”[13] 

There may be continuing or even increased violence in Darfur, and those who oppose the Application will likely point to that violence as a vindication of their view; however, such an argument does nothing to advance the interests of peace.  Attacks against civilians, refugees, and peacekeepers continue in Darfur after more than five years of violence.  In response to the Application, some officials in Al Bashir’s Government threatened increased violence, particularly directed at peacekeepers and humanitarian aide workers.[14]  Such attacks on peacekeepers may be war crimes under the Rome Statute.  Al Bashir recently suggested he could expel the UNAMID force if he is indicted.[15]  These assertions by the government of Sudan demonstrate clear hostility to the peace process in Darfur and contempt for the international community’s desire to end the conflict in Darfur.  In no domestic jurisdiction could a government official assert that efforts to prosecute suspected criminals should be curtailed because they may lead to increased violence from those suspects.  The global community cannot accept a similar argument from the critics of international justice. 

Proponents of the Application argue that it may actually “advance the interests of peace” because “the increased pressure now placed on the [National Congress Party] governing regime will lead it to take long overdue steps to cease all violence, implement genuine and credible measures to resolve the Darfur crisis—including allowing the full and effective deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping force—and fully carry out its side of the bargain to implement the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).”[16]  Media outlets recently quoted Sudanese Foreign Minister, Deng Alor as saying, “Everything short of the presidency is on the table,” which implies that the Government of Sudan may finally be willing to hand over the two Sudanese officials previously indicted by the ICC.[17] 

In the wake of the Application, the Government of Sudan also reportedly began to use domestic courts to investigate crimes in Darfur.  In August, the Sudanese Justice Minister appointed an investigator to examine the crimes in Darfur,[18] and the Government of Sudan has established committees to support the Justice Minister’s mandate.[19]  The Special Investigator recently confirmed he is investigating Ali Kushayb, who has been previously indicted by the ICC for war crimes.[20]  While the Government may be using these mechanisms in a purely political effort to placate the ICC, it nevertheless represents movement on the Darfur peace process thereby possibly breaking the years of status quo. 

Statements and actions by the Government of Sudan in the wake of the Application suggest that the Application may promote justice as well as peace, despite continued threats of violence.  Indeed, some analysts suggest that the Application may force the Sudanese Government to negotiate because it created a situation that may be “beyond the political and diplomatic capacity of the government.”[21]

About the Public International Law & Policy Group

The Public International Law & Policy Group, a 2005 Nobel Peace Prize nominee, is a non-profit organization, which operates as a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to states and governments involved in peace negotiations, drafting post-conflict constitutions, and prosecuting war criminals.  To facilitate the utilization of this legal assistance, PILPG also provides policy formulation advice and training on matters related to conflict resolution.  The Public International Law & Policy Group has advised the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Iraqi Special Tribunal; states in peace processes including the Anuak, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Darfur rebel movements, as well as key leaders of the Darfur Diaspora affected by the conflict.

The Guardian is reporting today that the UK, France, China and Russia will be asking the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution blocking the International Criminal Court from continuing the effort to prosecute Sudanese President al-Bashir for Genocide in Darfur.  See:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/14/sudan.humanrights

The United States has not yet decided whether to support such a resolution, and as a Permanent Member of the Council (and the first country to label the situation in Darfur as genocide) it could exercise its veto, thereby allowing the International Criminal Court arrest warrant to issue without political interference.

It will be absolutely tragic if the United States and the other members of the Security Council give in to al-Bashir’s blackmail, adopting a resolution ordering the ICC to defer its prosecution of the indicted genocidaire and war criminal in return for his pledge to cooperate with the UN and OAU.  If history has taught us anything, it is that the international community cannot rely on indicted war criminals to serve as reliable guarantors of peace.  Like Slobodan Milosevic, Radavan Karadzic, and Charles Taylor, al-Bashir cannot be trusted to follow through with his pledges of cooperation.  Al-Bashir has and will continue to direct a genocidal policy while under  the pretense of cooperation.  Nothing will actually be gained by quashing the ICC indictment, and so much will be lost.

A Security Council resolution ordering the ICC to defer its prosecution of al-Bashir would be a serious blow to the  credibility and legitimacy of the ICC and the growing trend toward international accountability.  It will return the world to a cynical age in which future warlords, parroting Hitler’s  infamous words about the Armenians, will be able to say to their followers, “Who after all today remembers the fate of the Darfurians.”   

Where should the line be drawn between “just war” and “war crime”?  That is the question at the heart of the upcoming day-long AIDP American National Section’s annual conference at Case Western Reserve University School of Law on Friday, September 26.

The conference features two dozen of the world’s foremost experts in this area, including: President of the International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties Christian Wenaweser; Former Nuremberg Prosecutors Henry King and Ben Ferencz; Former Deputy Legal Adviser, UK Foreign Ministry (who resigned over the invasion of Iraq), Elizabeth Wilmshurst;  Former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer; Former Chair of the ICC Statute Drafting Committee Cherif Bassiouni; Executive Director of the International Bar Association Mark Ellis; Former Commissioner of the Sierra Leone Truth Commission Bill Schabas; and academic experts from, Austria, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Liechtenstein, New Zealand and the United States.

The Conference, and an Experts Meeting the following day, is designed to advance the work of the International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, and the report of the Experts Meeting, along with the articles generated from the conference, will be published in the spring 2009 issue of the Case Western Journal of International Law.

The September 26 Conference is free and open to the public, and complementary lunch is provided if you register in advance.  In addition, 7.0 hours of CLE credit is available ($200 fee).   For a schedule of events and on line registration, please visit:  http://law.case.edu/lectures.  If you can’t make it to Case for the conference next week, you can view the proceedings live (or at any time) via webcast at that same URL.

The Conference is co-sponsored by the American Society of International Law, International Bar Association, International Association of Penal Law, International Law Association, the Planethood Foundation, the Robert H. Jackson Center, the Maltz Museum of Jewish Heritage, and the Wolf Family Foundation.

We are pleased to announce that “Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein” (St. Martin’s Press), “a work of non-fiction written like a novel” by AIDP American National Section President Michael Scharf and Vanderbilt Law Professor Michael Newton, will be available tomorrow, September 16, in bookstores everywhere.

The questions addressed in the book are among the most important issues facing the world today, and are at the core of the 2008 American Presidential election:  How should the United States respond to atrocities in foreign countries, such as Darfur, Burma, and Georgia?  What is the best approach to rebuilding Iraq and dealing with the Arabic speaking world? Where should we draw the line in what is acceptable in our fight against terrorism?  – to mention only a few.

 For more information about this “page-turner brimming with illuminating anecdotes,” including chapter excerpts, readings by the authors, color photographs, links to television and radio interviews about the book, and Q&A with the authors, please visit:

http://enemyofthestatebook.com/

View my article, Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law—A Re-Evaluation, published in the Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 

Abstract

Traditional state v. state war is largely a relic.  How then does a nation-state defend itself—preemptively—against an unseen enemy?  Existing international law—the Caroline Doctrine, UN Charter Article 51, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373—do not provide sufficiently clear guidelines regarding when a state may take preemptive or anticipatory action against a non-state actor.  This article proposes rearticulating international law to allow a state to act earlier provided sufficient intelligence is available. After examining international law this article proposes a process-based “strict-scrutiny” approach to self-defense. Under this approach, the executive will have to convince a court, based on relevant, reliable, viable and corroborated intelligence, that preemptive action is appropriate. This process leads to a check on the power of the executive by placing a judicial check on preemptive action, consequently establishing objective legal criteria for operational counterterrorism.

View a response written by Muge Kinacioglu, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Turkey, A Response to Amos Guiora: Reassessing the Parameters of Use of Force in the Age of Terrorism: Pre-emptive Action and International Law.

View another response written by Tarcisio Gazzini, Faculty of Law, VU University, Amsterdam, A Response to Amos Guiora’s Article on Pre-Emptive Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors. 

Cross-posted on National Security Advisors.

Click here for more information on my panel addressing  the prosecution of terrorism, videocast on September 11, 2008 from 5:00-8:00 am MST.

I recently visited Google’s Mountain View, CA headquarters to discuss my book Constitutional Limits on Coercive Interrogation. This event took place on August 18, 2008, as part of the Authors@Google series.

View my part of the series here on youtube.com.

In The Constitutional Limits of Coercive Investigation, I offer a theoretical analysis and a practical application of coercive interrogation, and in doing so, suggest developing and implementing a hybrid paradigm based on American criminal law, the Geneva Convention, and the Israeli model of trial as the most relevant judicial regime. I offer a unique perspective to the public debate by utilizing a historical analysis of the system of “justice” for African-Americans in the Deep South of the past century to serve as a guide for the constitutional rights and protections which need to be granted or extended to an unprotected class. I then indicate which interrogation methods are within the boundaries of the law by both recommending protection of the detainees and providing interrogators with the tools required to protect America’s vital interests.

Cross-posted on National Security Advisors.

Available now at the Northwestern Law Review website, and appearing in the print edition this Fall is my essay“Beyond Guantanamo, Obstacles and Options.”  Part 1 appears today, and Part 2 will appear this Thursday.  

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),[1] passed after the Supreme Court’s Hamdan[2] decision was intended to remedy shortcomings in prior military commissions. Implementing the MCA has proven difficult, as observers have witnessed the high profile resignation of the system’s chief prosecutor, and Congressional hearings questioning the future of terrorism trials. These issues were punctuated by the Supreme Court’s Boumediene[3] decision holding that detainees have a Constitutional right to habeas corpus. Observers unfamiliar with the processes involved with the military commissions may have thought that the Boumediene decision would force the administration to forgo military commissions, perhaps opting instead for trials in Article III courts. However, nothing in the decision required such a result.

In fact, just two months after the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision, the trial of Osama bin Laden’s alleged bodyguard Salim Hamdan—the first terrorism-related trial by military commission—concluded in a guilty verdict on charges that he provided material support for terrorism.[4] While lower courts begin to work out the details of the Boumediene decision Hamdan will have a simultaneous opportunity to appeal his conviction, and the legitimacy of the tribunal that tried him. In short, when the dust settles, Congress will again be faced with a need to reform military commissions or to prepare the federal judiciary for terrorism trials. This Essay seeks to contribute to that reform discussion.

CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE READING Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and Options (Part 1 of 2)

What’s the Exchange Rate?

Amos Guiora, Professor of Law, S.J.Quinney College of Law, The University of Utah

And Martha Minow, Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor, Harvard Law School

We are trying to understand why Israel traded dead Sgt. Ehud Goldvasser and First Sergeant Eldad Regev for live Samir Kuntar, and what it means for Israel and other nations.

Trades in the past reflected the desire to avoid military action.  In 1985, Israel released 1,150 prisoners in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured in Lebanon. Then-Defense Minister Yitzhak explained: “When no military option exists, there is no choice but to enter negotiations and pay a price.”

This time, Israel exchanged five imprisoned known terrorists for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers–although much was made about the possibility that the soldiers were alive. A representative of Hezbollah (the “party of God” is an Iranian-backed Shiite terrorist organization) said “for two years you (Israelis) have wondered what the is the fate of the soldiers” and the camera spun to the sight of two coffins–while 5 terrorist suspects returned–alive-to Lebanon.

In fact, the Israeli government did not tell the public before the exchange, the intelligence community was convinced three days after the attack that the two soldiers were dead.  Indeed, because approximately ten liters of blood had been lost by the soldiers, as found near the command car, the evidence all but established that they were dead.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Olmert argued that the two soldiers must be returned–and initiated the second Lebanon War on that ground. Demonstrating that “no soldier can be left behind”–the ethos commendable in practice–this action also obviously exacted a high price. In the immediate aftermath of the kidnapping, five soldiers were killed in an effort to rescue the two soldiers.

The ultimate exchange of the soldiers’ dead bodies in exchange for the release of Samir Kuntar and four other Lebanese endangers otherwise innocent citizens.  The price may be even higher—as will be the danger to Israeli citizens–if 1000 Hamas terrorists are released in order to free Gilad Shalit–shifting the “exchange rate” even further.

The commitment to leave no Israeli soldier behind–even at such high a price–is a big reason for the recent exchange. Another reason is the truly brilliant advocacy and media campaign by Karnit Goldvasser. Goldvasser’s vow that she will bring her husband home shows admirable personal commitment and extraordinary persuasiveness.

Yet even to understand why this could work–why the drumbeat of media attention to the captured two IDF soldiers could torque the negotiation and strategic policy of a savvy, experienced nation state, deserves more careful explanation.

At one level, a small nation that has been in an armed conflict since its founding 60 years ago is a family of families, moving between defiant embrace of life and the mourning rituals for both the literal dead and the loss of innocent, carefree lives. The vast majority of families has immediate connections with the military–one child a year away from service; one still serving; a brother just called up for reserve duty; an uncle still recovering from a wrenching time as check-point guard.

What parent wouldn’t want the government to do anything—and everything–to recover a missing soldier-daughter or son?  If a parent is in the drivers’ seat, no price is too high, no measure to risky if there is a chance of recovering the child alive, and even recovering the remains of the cherished family member. Moreover, combat soldiers in recent days have expressed their support the exchange, and noted it is important for them to know that should they fall into captivity the state will do anything to release them.

But what is the obligation of the state when it sends soldier to combat? Does the state owe that individual “everything” should something happen? What are the limits of state obligation? What does “everything” mean? Turn over 1,000 members of Hamas for Gilad Shalit? Or East Jerusalem?

Leaving no one behind was once a source of great pride and confidence. Thirty two years ago (almost to the day) in the 1976 Entebbe raid IDF soldiers rescued Israelis held in Uganda. But today, a policy to “leave no one behind” raises huge questions, as it seems to elevate the state’s obligation far above the soldier’s fellow citizens (and families).  During the Second Lebanon War, Israel seemed to “accept” civilian loss of life more readily than it accepted soldiers dying in battle.

Ultimately, engaging in the exchange for the two bodies heightened risks for civilians.  How so? The very fact of the “exchange” with terrorist organizations Israel shows that that kidnapping pays. By releasing terrorists with a proven “track record” (Hamas will only accept an exchange that includes terrorists who have killed Israelis from both sides of the Green Line) Israel increases the likelihood of new terrorist attacks in the future by the newly released individuals or those who would copy them. According to many experts the 1985 exchange between Israel and Ahmed Gibril contributed to the Intifada for many of the 1,500 active participants.

For the recent exchange alone, the price has already been higher than many would have imagined. Nasarallah embraced Samir Kintar: Lebanon made his return a holiday in Lebanon and both the Prime Minister and the President welcomed him home. Watching the celebration of Samir Kuntar as hero is incomprehensible–after all he killed a father in the presence of his four year girl and then smashed his rifle butt into the little girls head. He is also responsible for the tragic death of that little girl’s two year old sister who was accidentally smothered to death by her mother who-in an effort to prevent her from crying and alerting Kuntar to their hiding place.  Watching the embrace of Kuntar take place simultaneously with the burials of Goldvasser and Regev exacerbated the already difficult question of “what price for an exchange.”

By making the exchange, Israel has demonstrated that it is all negotiable; the only question is at what price. What will be the exchange rate in the future? Is a bargain also to include selling out the state’s obligation to its citizens who are potential targets of terrorism upon the release of convicted terrorists who vow to act again?

Israel’s exchange offers a window onto the desperate desire of ordinary Israeli’s for an end to all the conflict; do anything for the children, even be gullible, even if it’s too hard to stomach street celebrations of a murderer of little children, too unbearable to say nothing can be done to the grieving families of soldiers whom the state put in harm’s way?

In exchange, on an emotional level, all Israelis were with Goldvasser and Regev for one day. But–is Israel stronger strategically? 

Even asking this cruel and painful question especially to anyone whose own family member could be subject to such an exchange is difficult. Talking national security in a strategic sense is all important –except when your own family member is involved. “Leave no one behind” seems the ethos to reconcile national security and family love, but hard headed assessment reveals these two goals are not always reconcilable.

Cross-posted on National Security Advisors

View my article, International Cooperation in Homeland Security.

Abstract

Terrorism against the United States, post-9/11, reaches far beyond the U.S. borders. In order to effectively prevent and react to terrorism within the homeland, the U.S. must think of security internationally. International security efforts touch on key issues such as travel security, border control, immigration, intelligence, and financing terrorism. This article examines the U.S. effort at international cooperation in homeland security by examining security and threat assessment in order to analyze current developments and necessary progress moving forward. Further, this article explores comparative efforts at international cooperation in homeland security by examining Canada, Japan, and the E.U. in terms of security and threat assessment. Finally, this article offers recommendations and articulates criteria by which the U.S. can improve vital efforts at international cooperation in homeland security.

To ensure effective counterterrorism, the U.S. must follow a two step process. First, the U.S. must take measures to protect the homeland. Those measure include: promoting travel security by implementing sophisticated technology; promoting border security by securing the Northern border; implementing intelligence sharing between agencies; creating a coordinated plan to promote travel and border security; undergoing training and simulation, and finally; ensuring institutionalized continuity from one Administration to the next.

After taking action to protect the homeland, the U.S. must use these factors as a foundation on which to establish international cooperation. To establish effective international cooperation in homeland security, the U.S. must take measures including the following: forging international partnerships; sharing intelligence related to travel security; creating a coordinated international security plan; running international training and simulation exercises, and finally; implementing international institutionalized continuity.

Cross posted on National Security Advisors.

Similarly posted on Legal Theory Blog.