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Archived: 08/07/2008 at 18:37:52

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Victor Hansen

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August 06, 2008

United States v. Siddiqui: Was She Almost the First Female Detainee at GTMO?

A very bizarre case. The criminal complaint is posted here. The DOJ press release appears below, but you should also check out this report from the LA Times mentioning allegations of Siddiqui's role as a significant player in al Qaeda's WMD program. From that perspective, it is interesting that the government elected to pursue criminal prosecution in an Article III court rather than military detention.

From the DOJ press release:


[The Justice Department announced] the arrest of Aafia Siddiqui on charges related to her attempted murder and assault of United States officers and employees in Afghanistan. Siddiqui arrived in New York this evening and will be presented tomorrow before a United States Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. According to the Complaint filed in Manhattan federal court:

On July 17, 2008, officers of the Ghazni Province Afghanistan National Police ("ANP") observed Siddiqui
outside the Ghazni governor's compound. ANP officers questioned Siddiqui, regarded her as suspicious, and
searched her handbag. In it, they found numerous documents describing the creation of explosives, as well as excerpts from the Anarchist's Arsenal. Siddiqui's papers included descriptions of various landmarks in the United States, including in New York City. Siddiqui was also in possession of substances that were sealed in bottles and glass jars.

On July 18, 2008, a party of United States personnel, including two FBI special agents, a United States Army
Warrant Officer, a United States Army Captain, and United States military interpreters, arrived at the Afghan
facility where Siddiqui was being held. The personnel entered a second floor meeting room -- unaware that
Siddiqui was being held there, unsecured, behind a curtain.

The Warrant Officer took a seat and placed his United States Army M-4 rifle on the floor next to the curtain.
Shortly after the meeting began, the Captain heard a woman yell from the curtain and, when he turned, saw
Siddiqui holding the Warrant Officer's rifle and pointing it directly at the Captain. Siddiqui said, "May the blood of [unintelligible] be directly on your [unintelligible, possibly head or hands]." The interpreter seated closest to Siddiqui lunged at her and pushed the rifle away as Siddiqui pulled the trigger. Siddiqui fired at least two shots but no one was hit. The Warrant Officer returned fire with a 9 mm service pistol and fired approximately two rounds at Siddiqui's torso, hitting her at least once.

Despite being shot, Siddiqui struggled with the officers when they tried to subdue her; she struck and kicked
them while shouting in English that she wanted to kill Americans. After being subdued, Siddiqui temporarily lost consciousness. The agents and officers then rendered medical aid to Siddiqui.

Siddiqui, a 36-year-old Pakistani woman who previously resided in the United States, is charged in a criminal
Complaint filed in the Southern District of New York with one count of attempting to kill United States officers and employees and one count of assaulting United States officers and employees. If convicted, Siddiqui faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison on each charge.

Hamdan, Material Support, and the Ex Post Facto Issue

[Update: Tony Arend (G'town) has a persuasive take in response to the questions raised below. See here.]

Hamdan’s conviction this morning on material support charges has led many people to ask whether (i) material support was a war crime between 1996 and 2001 and (ii) if not, whether this violates the Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto prosecution. Judge Allred ruled on these issues on July 14, in this opinion . He held as follows:

a. The Ex Post Facto Clause does apply to Hamdan

b. There is evidence for and against the proposition that material support is a war crime

c. Because the Constitution grants Congress the power to “define” and punish violations of the law of nations, courts must defer to Congress insofar as it concludes that material support was a war crime at the time of Hamdan’s conduct.

In short, the ex post facto issue turns on a separation of powers question concerning the allocation of interpretive authority (something not usually in issue): does the “define and punish” clause require courts to give binding deference to a legislative conclusion that material support not only should be but always has been a war crime. Only after rejecting that proposition would a reviewing court then reach an independent judgment on the merits of the interpretive question. This will, no doubt, be a central issue on appeal.

The Hamdan Verdict - A Government Stroke of Fortune?

The verdict returned by the trial panel (no one should ever mistake a group hand selected by the authority responsible for the decision to prosecute as a "jury') in Guantanamo today reflects extremely well on the six officers given the unenviable task of participating in a badly flawed system.  The government is already proclaiming the outcome as vindication of the commission process.  The ironic reality is that the partial verdict - conviction on five specifications of providing material support to terrorism but acquittal on the charge of conspiracy and three other specifications of providing material support - is actually a much better outcome for the prosecution than a more complete conviction would have been.  By limiting the grounds on which the defense can appeal, the verdict as returned largely saves the government from its own egregious overreaching.

While the commissions conducted under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 are a considerable improvement over those struck down by the Supreme Court in its 2004 Hamdan decision, the reality is that the process still has a number of legal flaws sufficient to ensure that convictions will not ultimately stand up to the test of time in the world court of public opinion.  Among these are:

(1) Charges lacking any foundation in the law of war, which means that there is no lawful military jurisdiction over them.   The is fairly broad agreement among legal scholars, and four sitting Supreme Court justices have already agreed, that Conspiracy does not constitute a violation of the law of war.  Acquittal on this charge means that it will not be appealled, and allows the government the opportunity to continue to prosecute other defendants for this offense for the forseeable future.

Providing material support to terrorism is also quite questionable -- I do not think it is a valid charge --  but the authority is potentially not as clearcut on this point so the government has a better chance of prevailing on an appeal on this charge.

(2) Conviction based on evidence obtained through coercion.  While the MCA bans use of evidence obtained via "torture," it leaves the door fairly open for the admission of statements obtained through coercion falling short of actual torture.  Realistically any statements made by someone subject to the stress of prolonged isolated confinement, even short of any sleep deprivation, temperature extremes, etc. should fail to meet any reasonable measure of "voluntariness," but that standard is not adopted by the MCA.   Although it is impossible to know without reading the actual courtroom transcripts, it is quite possible that there is sufficient physical evidence or testimony of third parties (e.g., those involved in Hamdan's capture) to support Hamdan's conviction on some of the material support allegations without having to rely on his own incriminatory statements.  So it is entirely possible that on appeal it will be found that the use of Hamdan's statements did not materially prejudice him even if they really should not have been allowed in by any recognized standards of judicial fairness.

(3) No right to representation by counsel of choice.  This is a serious issue for many of the detainees that could ultimately be a fatal flaw in the commission process, but does not seem to be an issue in Hamdan's case.  (Today's verdict has no impact on this issue).

(4) Lack of equal protection.  A fundamental flaw of the commission process to date has been that a defendant's treatment is in large part based upon nationality -- Americans are excluded by law, Brits have been by policy, Australians and Canadians get special privileges denied to citizens of Muslim countries, etc.  While not a legal issue subject to appeal, the fact that Hick's relatives were allowed to attend his trial while Hamdan only got a post-trial phone call to his wife highlights the ongoing nature of this problem.  Again today's result does not really impact this issue.

One of things that I do find impressive about the panel's verdict is that the members were apparently able to resist being persuaded to convict on the conspiracy charge  by the inflamatory video and arguments the government introduced about al Qaeda atrocities.  Had they returned a conviction on that charge, the use of the video would likely have been a core issue on appeal.  Given that acquittal, however, it is hard to see how an argument that the video was unfairly prejudicial would gain much traction in an appeal of the material support count.

The judge's instructions to the trial panel, which failed to state that delivering missiles to be used against military forces constitutes a war crime also ultimately works to government advantage in my view.  If the government had prevailed on this point, it means that everyone from Ronald Reagan to Charlie Wilson, to my colleagues at the Pentagon during my service in the South East Asia branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1984-85, to the CIA folks involved in supporting the Mujahidin in Afghanistan during the Soviet Afghan war are war criminals.  While U.S. prosecutions for such conduct are obviously unlikely, such an outcome could have consequences from emboldening nations like Russia to press charges to the more mundane but perhaps real possibility that they might persuade some U.S. judges to overturn the conviction to avoid attaching this stigma to fellow Americans.

Overall I think the most positive thing about the verdict is that six anonymous military officers engaged in mature consideration of how to apply the law as it was given to them to the facts that they were presented.  Whatever flaws exist in the system, it is not fair to pin it on these individuals, and I believe this highlights that had the government conducted the CSRT process in good faith and made a real effort to present all available information to the participants in those panels, a good deal of the subsequent controversy over Guantanamo could have been avoided.  Whether Hamdan should ultimately have been convicted or not, there does seem to be sufficient information in the public record to justify his indefinite detention as a member of a force hostile to the United States engaged in a conflict against it.
 

Hamdan: Breakdown of the Convictions and Acquittals

Hamdan has been convicted of some charges, acquitted of others.  Here is the breakdown (note that the charge sheet is posted here).

 

Count 1: Conspiracy

 

Specification 1: conspiracy to commit a variety of offenses (attacks on civilians, etc.) – acquitted

 

Specification 2: conspiracy to commit murder in violation of the law of war by attacking US and coalition servicemen – acquitted (note that this specification was the subject of much news coverage yesterday, as it turned out that Judge Allred instructed the jury that the charge required proof that the conspiracy targeted "protected persons" (civilians or persons rendered hors de combat) )

 

Count 2: Material Support

 

Specification 1: Providing himself as personnel to al Qaeda with knowledge or intent that this support would "be used for an act of terrorism"  (a count analogous to 18 USC 2339A)– acquitted

 

Specification 2: Providing himself as personnel to al Qaeda, period (a count analogous to 18 USC 2339B, which unlike 2339A does not require any linkage to another offense) – CONVICTED


Specification 3: Providing al Qaeda with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles in November 2001, knowing they would be used for an act of terrorism (again along the lines of 2339A) – acquitted

 

Specification 4: Providing al Qaeda with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles in November 2001, period (again along the lines of 2339B) – acquitted

 

Specification 5: Providing support to al Qaeda through his service as a driver, knowing this would facilitate communications and planning for terrorist acts – CONVICTED

 

Specification 6: similar to Specification 5 – CONVICTED

 

Specification 7: Providing support to al Qaeda through service as a bodyguard, knowing this would facilitate communications and planning for terrorist acts – CONVICTED

 

Specification 8: similar to Specification 7 – CONVICTED

 

It seems to me that there was little doubt Hamdan would be convicted on the support charges relating to his service as a driver and bodyguard, and my understanding is that Judge Allred may have issued rulings relating to Specifications 3 and 4 that made it less likely that the jury would convict on those counts (I'm not sure of the details, however).  We also know from news accounts yesterday that Judge Allred instructed the jury that the second Specification on Conspiracy required proof that the conspiracy targeted civilians or other protected persons rather than soldiers, ensuring an acquittal on that particular issue.  And so the only real surprises here, arguably, are the acquittals on the first conspiracy specification and the first material support specification. 

 

Next we'll have the sentencing, but the real action from this point forward is in the appellate process as Hamdan challenges (i) the constitutionality of various procedural aspects of the trial and (ii) the substantive legality of the offenses charged.  Ultimately, we may see the Supreme Court confronted with the question of whether "material support" was a crime triable by military commission between 1996 and 2001 and, if not, whether this invalidates Hamdan's conviction. 

 

CACI Premier Technology v. Rhodes,et al. (4th Cir.)

A Fourth Circuit panel has affirmed summary judgment in CACI’s defamation suit arising out of statements on Randi Rhodes’ Air America program linking CACI to abuses at Abu Ghraib. The Court held that Rhodes’ statements either were not made with actual malice or were not statements of fact.

The opinion is posted here.


An interesting excerpt from the opinion:

The district court determined "that CACI is a public figure because of [its] prominent role in the circumstances surrounding the events that occurred at Abu Ghraib--an issue of grave public concern ." J.A. 1091-92. CACI does not contest its status as a public figure. CACI became a public figure because the U.S. Army's military intelligence branch was woefully short of interrogators and engaged CACI to provide civilian interrogators at Abu Ghraib. CACI surely knew when it accepted the interrogation work that it was potentially exposing itself to the inhospitable climate of media criticism--criticism that could be emboldened by the actual malice standard. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (stating that "the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood"); Hatfill v. New York Times Co., --- F.3d ----, ----, No. 07-1124, slip op. at 8 (4th Cir. Jul. 14, 2008) (same). After the shocking pictures of the Abu Ghraib abuses were broadcast on 60 Minutes II in April 2004, and even more shocking revelations followed, CACI became a prime target of media criticism and comment. As the district court aptly noted, "[h]eads of states, public officials, media sources, academics, and individuals throughout the world took note of, and commented on, the events at the Abu Ghraib prison," where CACI played a prominent role. J.A. 1092.

August 05, 2008

Parhat v. Gates (D.C. Cir.) and the Scope of the Government’s Detention Power

Lyle Denniston has the latest development in Parhat v. Gates here. 

While the dispute over a court's authority to order a detainee released into the U.S. is important, what caught my eye here is the government's decision to no longer defend its categorization of Parhat as an "enemy combatant."  Parhat's DTA review petition had raised the question whether persons associated with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) could fall within the scope of the government's military detention authority, on the theory that ETIM was sufficiently linked to al Qaeda to warrant such an extension (or perhaps that ETIM itself had fought against the US or its allies). See Marty Lederman's comments here

The government's decision to treat Parhat as no-longer-an-enemy-combatant would seem to put that issue to the side for now.  I'm not sure which case now becomes the most likely candidate for a ruling on the scope of the government's authority to detain persons who were neither al Qaeda nor Taliban members nor were accused of engaging in hostile acts. Let me know if you have a candidate case in mind.

DoD Replaces Counterintelligence Field Activity with the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center

From DoD's press release (note the final line):

The Department of Defense activated the Defense Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Center today, and simultaneously disestablished the Department's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). The new center, under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), combines CIFA resources and responsibilities with longstanding DIA CI and HUMINT capabilities. 

"The realignment of CIFA's functions and resources into DIA strengthens the close historical and operational relationship between counterintelligence and HUMINT," said Army Maj. Gen. Theodore Nicholas, the center's new director. "Integration under one organization will result in greater collaboration in operational and support areas where both disciplines overlap."

The Defense CI and HUMINT Center was created in response to internal DoD assessments which identified substantial benefits of more closely aligning DoD CIFA and DIA HUMINT and CI functions. It is also consistent with DoD strategic guidance and the Defense Intelligence Strategy.

The center will focus on the related disciplines of CI and HUMINT. CIFA's designation as a law enforcement activity did not transfer to DIA. The new center will have no law enforcement function.

July 31, 2008

Executive Order: Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (July 31, 2008)

The long-awaited revision to EO 12333 is now out, and available here.


From the accompanying White House press statement:

The President has issued an Executive Order to revise Executive Order 12333, which governs United States intelligence activities. The revised Executive Order implements the reforms enacted into law by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and creates a more unified, integrated, and collaborative Intelligence Community under the leadership of the Director of National Intelligence.

Originally issued by President Reagan in 1981, Executive Order 12333 is a cornerstone document for the Intelligence Community. The Executive Order sets strategic goals and defines roles and responsibilities within the Intelligence Community, while also affirming the Nation's commitment to protect Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights in the conduct of intelligence activities. The revised Executive Order reiterates the importance of timely, accurate, and insightful intelligence to our national security. It also renews the original Order's charge that all "reasonable and lawful means" are to be used to ensure that our Nation receives the best possible intelligence.

Implementation of the revised Executive Order will help create an Intelligence Community that is more unified, shares information more freely, effectively coordinates its actions, and collaborates more closely to provide policymakers the support needed to make difficult decisions affecting our national and homeland security. The revised Executive Order emphasizes the increased importance of protecting the United States from terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The revised Executive Order maintains and strengthens existing protections for Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights and preserves the existing ban on assassination and limitations on human experimentation.

The Washington Post’s story adds the following useful recap:

Details of the revamped order were expected to be unveiled by the White House today, but a summary of the major changes was spelled out in a White House PowerPoint presentation shared in advance with congressional oversight committees. The eight-page slide presentation was obtained by The Washington Post.

The main purpose of the reforms was to "clarify and strengthen the role of the DNI as head of the intelligence community," the presentation states. The new order gives the DNI primary authority to issue "overarching policies and procedures" and to ensure that intelligence collection is coordinated among the 16 agencies. It also conveys greater power to set spending priorities and establish standards for training and tradecraft.

In one of the more controversial changes, the new order allows the DNI to formulate policy for engaging with the intelligence agencies and security services of other countries -- a role traditionally held by the CIA. But the new policy stipulates that the CIA would "coordinate implementation" of those policies.

Left essentially unchanged is a prohibition against assassinations of foreign leaders, as well as long-standing restrictions on "human experimentation," the document states. It asserts that the intelligence community would "maintain or strengthen privacy and civil liberty protections."


July 30, 2008

Waxman on Administrative Detention

Matthew C. Waxman, “Administrative Detention: The Integration of Strategy and Legal Process” (Brookings/Hoover/Georgetown)

http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0724_detention_waxman.aspx

This draft book chapter – which Matt will be editing and expanding extensively – is part of a forthcoming book jointly sponsored by Brookings, Hoover, and Georgetown, under the editorship of Ben Wittes. I quote the full introduction below:

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush, holding that prisoners at Guantanamo have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their detention by federal courts, has injected new fuel into the debate about whether Congress should enact administrative detention legislation. To its advocates, administrative detention—or detention by the Executive branch without criminal prosecution in the courts—is a potentially important counter-terrorism tool. New legislation, they argue, would more effectively and legitimately regulate detention practices of suspected terrorists that to date the Bush Administration has conducted under an expansive notion of unilateral war powers. But critics warn that administrative detention is a dangerous tool as well, not just because it threatens liberty and entails expanded powers of the State, but also because its overuse or injudicious use may be counter-productive in combating violent extremism. Rather than institutionalizing and regulating it through legislation, opponents and skeptics of administrative detention generally argue that, especially outside combat zones, detention of suspected terrorists should be handled through criminal prosecution, with its tight rules limiting state powers and safeguarding individual suspects’ liberties. According to a recent statement by the Constitution Project, administrative detention proposals “neglect basic and fundamental principles of American constitutional law, and they assume incorrectly that the traditional processes have proven ineffective.”

My purpose in these pages is not to convince the reader that a new administrative detention regime is necessary, nor do I mean to offer a specific legislative roadmap towards one. I have argued elsewhere for “a durable, long-term framework for handling detainees—one that lets [the United States government] hold the most dangerous individuals [it captures] and collect intelligence from them (including through lawful interrogation), but also (unlike Guantanamo Bay) has rules and procedures that are politically, legally and diplomatically sustainable.” Other papers in this series argue for various approaches to preventive detention. In this paper, rather, I aim to examine what seem at first like simple questions underlying the discussion of administrative detention and the possible need for new laws: in combating terrorism, why administratively detain, and detain whom?

The answers to these questions seem obvious at first. We should detain individuals to prevent terrorism and, to that end, we should detain terrorists. And with those basic ideas apparently settled, the administrative detention debate tends to jump quickly to the question of how to detain: What procedural protections should we afford suspects? What rights should we grant them to challenge evidence proffered against them? What kinds of officials will adjudicate cases? Those advocating new administrative detention laws generally call for robust judicial review of what have largely been executive-only detention decisions since the early days of the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror—perhaps by a new “national security court” charged with overseeing a process that includes adversarial process and meaningful assistance of lawyers. And at that point, the discussion moves just as quickly to questions of institutional design, and such procedural details as evidentiary rules, the type of judges who will hear these cases, detainee access to counsel, and counsel’s own access to classified information. Administration detention critics, too, focus heavily on the procedural dynamics of administrative detention proposals: how would detention decision-making and, for that matter, the standards and rules governing those decisions, deviate from normal criminal justice rules?

The Supreme Court similarly focused almost exclusively on procedural mechanisms in its Boumediene ruling. While mandating that Guantanamo detainees receive access to U.S. federal courts empowered to correct errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain,” the Court made clear that it was “not address[ing] the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”

The questions everyone seems keen to skip over, however, are not nearly as obvious as their omission suggests. In this paper, I therefore take a step back from the issues surrounding how to make and review detention decisions and engage the antecedent questions of why detain and, therefore, whom to detain. In doing so, I mean to advance two overarching arguments that should guide the discussion of whether the United States needs administrative detention laws and, if so, of what type. First, any discussion of administrative detention should begin with a clear understanding of the strategic rationale for administrative detention and a sense of how detention fits within a broader counter-terrorism and national security strategy. Our answers to the “why detain?” question will drive our answers to the “whom to detain?” question, and those answers together will significantly affect the matrix of costs and benefits of legal innovation. Second, the way we answer the “why” and “whom” questions will, in turn, significantly determine the procedural architecture of any new administrative detention regime. This paper therefore cautions against jumping too quickly in administrative detention discussions to the issue of procedural design, or the “how” questions.

To whatever extent Congress decides that the United States needs a new administrative detention apparatus, this analysis points in favor of narrowing significantly the strategic flexibility and expansive operational latitude the Bush Administration has asserted through its legal interpretations. It recommends that architects of proposed administrative detention schemes focus on the strategic objectives of either immediate-term disruption of terrorist plots or long-term incapacitation of suspected terrorists (and, as this analysis shows, it may not be as easy as it seems to design a system that does both effectively). Further, it advises against broad substantive criteria like “enemy combatancy” or “membership” in favor of a more narrow and specific inquiry of an individual’s supposed dangerousness, perhaps supplemented with additional substantive requirement. With those strategic aims and substantive detention criteria in mind, this paper comes back to the procedural debate and concludes with a discussion of effective, corresponding procedural design.

July 29, 2008

Complexity in the Afghan-Pakistan theater and the role of the war model in the war on terrorism

For those who've not been following the discussion thusfar at the opinio juris symposium on Ben Wittes' book, I want to draw attention to my recent post on the often-overlooked complexity of the situation in the Afghan-Pakistan theater. It discusses a recent article by Bruce Hoffman and Seth Jones that sheds some interesting lot on larger questions about who counts as the enemy in the war on terrorism.