On June 24, 2007, the Iraqi High Tribunal handed down its decision in the Anfal Campaign trial, convicting “Chemical Ali” (Ali Hassan al-Majid) and five other high ranking military leaders of the former Iraqi Regime of international crimes related to their roles in a 1980s crackdown against northern Iraqi Kurds (English version of Judgment available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp . On Tuesday, January 29, 2008, Case Western Reserve University School of Law hosted a two-hour live presentation by the President/Chief Appeals Judge of the Iraqi High Tribunal, the five judges who presided over the Anfal Campaign trial, and the Prosecutor who tried the case. This trip to the United States marked their first public appearance outside of Iraq. Through a translator, the Judges and Prosecutor discussed the challenges that they faced, the precedent that their historic judgment sets, and the question of whether the proceedings were fair. They also discussed the controversy surrounding the pending execution of “Chemical Ali” — an issue that has been front page news this week. To view the transcript of this extraordinary session (including Q&A) on the Grotian Moment Blog, click on: http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/content.asp?t=1&id=141
In response to President Bush’s decision to veto legislation outlawing waterboarding, Daniel C. Barr (Perkins Coie Brown & Bain) and I wrote this op-ed, Veto of Bill Banning Torture Places Interrogators in a Bind, published in today’s Salt Lake Tribune.
Abstract:
Despite the fact that six years have passed since 9/11, the Pentagon’s recent decision to try six Guantanamo detainees for capital crimes such as terrorism and support of terrorism made national headlines. William Glaberson, U.S. Charges 6 With Key Roles in 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1. In this Debate, Professors Amos N. Guiora, of the University of Utah, and John T. Parry, of Lewis & Clark Law School, attempt to settle the question of what sort of forum is most appropriate to try the thousands of individuals in U.S. custody who are suspected of terrorism.
Professor Guiora considers three forum options: treaty-based international terror courts, traditional Article III courts, and a hybrid option he calls domestic terror courts. Ultimately, Professor Guiora argues in favor of domestic terror courts, which he describes as being able to balance the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security rights of the state. He considers this option to be the most practical and expedient policy solution, necessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding that some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national security, and an awareness that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality.
Professor Parry agrees that current U.S. policy toward detainees has been misguided, but does not believe that innovations of the sort proposed by Professor Guiora are necessary. Rather, he suggests that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather than hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts as a fallback option. Professor Parry points to research that shows that the federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in federal court, and therefore considers alternative proposals to Article III courts to be solution[s] in search of a problem. Professor Parry realizes that trial in federal court will not be possible for every suspected terrorist, and concludes that, [f]or people who pose a risk but whose conduct may not violate federal criminal law, prolonged preventive detention is the best choice.
AIDP members and others interested in international criminal law are invited to participate in the AIDP American National Section’s “World Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing” to be held at Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio on April 9-11, 2008.
Organized by an international program committee chaired by Case Law Professor (former Counsel to the IMF) Richard Gordon, the Terrorism Financing Conference is part of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal (AIDP)’s three-day Preparatory Colloquium for its XVIIIth International Congress of Penal Law. The first day (April 9) and third day (April 11) of the Preparatory Colloquium will consist of an expert’s meeting of foreign and American members of the AIDP, who will be debating and finalizing a resolution to be adopted at the World Congress in Istanbul in September 2009. The second day (April 10) will be a symposium open to the public, featuring panels on:
•· charities regulation and terrorism financing;
•· civil liberties considerations in creating lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations;
•· identification by financial institutions of suspicious transactions related to terrorism financing; and
•· the future of international cooperation in stopping terrorism financing.
The confirmed Conference speakers include: Carlos Eduardo Japiassu (former Secretary General of the International Association of Penal Law), Sue Eckert (formerly Assistant US Secretary of Export Administration), Rick Small (formerly Associate Director of the Federal Reserve System and Managing Director of Global Anti-Money Laundering at Citigroup), Jeff Breinholt (Deputy Chief, Counter-Terrorism Section of DOJ), Hermann Krull (Formerly Chief of Global Compliance, Standard Bank, Johannesburg, South Africa), Jean-Francis Thony (formerly Assistant General Counsel, Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, IMF), Jack Smith (Basel Institute on Governance), Rick McDonnell (Head of Secretariat, Financial Action Task Force, Paris), Emile van der Does de Willebois (The World Bank), Richard Barrett (UN al Qaeda Monitoring Team), Bruce Zagaris (Center for Strategic and International Studies), and Peter Csonka (Council of Europe, Dept of Crime Problems).
For those of you who can’t make it to Cleveland for the Terrorism Financing Conference, the webcast will be available for subsequent viewing at any time at: http://law.case.edu/lectures/ .
Off topic for us here in the AIDP Blog, but I just found this story horrifying:
The Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office said Tuesday that one of their own deputies is in trouble after she was caught on tape dumping a paraplegic man out of his wheelchair while he was being booked into jail, and three supervisors were nearby at the time but did nothing.
Video shows Deputy Jones dumping Sterner out of his wheelchair and onto the floor while she is booking him into the Hillsborough County Jail.The tape also shows the deputy then searching Sterner as he lay on the floor.
DoD has announced today that charges have been sworn against six detainees alleged to have been involved in the September 11th attacks.
Swearing of Charges- The cases have been sworn as capital cases and have been sworn collectively (e.g. all six will be on trial at once as co-conspirators). The new courtroom which is complete and will be operational in March has six defense tables and three prosecution tables, so the facilities can accomodate this number of defendants and counsel. Also, the new courtrooms have a glass wall which will allow the court to mute any discussion of classified information, but observers will still be able to observe what the parties are doing. This is similar to the international tribunals in the Hague with the exception that those international tribunals feature a steel wall which is lowered during the discussion of classified information, preventing observers from even seeing the parties.
The fact that these cases have been sworn as capital does not mean that the convening authority will refer them as capital, the convening authority has the discretion to bump charges down (e.g. from capital to non-capital, but cannot bump them up). In my opinion it is probably a better idea to let KSM et.al. languish in the general population of a prison, rather than execute them so their faces can appear in martyrdom videos and Al Qaeda propaganda.
After swearing, the convening authority reviews the charges for legal sufficiency and determines whether there is reasonable belief/probable cause that the evidence the government has put forth will support the charges alleged. There is no time limit for this review. Once the convening authority concludes that there is reasonable belief the evidence supports the charges, she refers it to trial.
Referral and Trial- Once referred the detainees must be arrainged within 30 days. The trial clock also begins at referral requiring that the accused be brought to trial within 120 days from referral. The trial clock stops for delays such as motions by the defense. For example, the Khadr case was referred in early May 2007, he was arrainged on November 8, 2007, however only 28 days of the 120 day clock have been used as a result of delay requests and appeals by the defense.
CIA Interrogation Evidence- Perhaps most importantly, a senior DoD official confirmed today that NO CIA interrogation evidence will be used in these trials. Much has been made lately of the waterboarding of three detainees, not using evidence derived from these interrogations may avoid some defense challenges. Also, it is important to note that information derived from torture cannot legally be used in the proceedings given the MCA’s explicit ban on such evidence. (Not everyone agrees the MCA’s ban is explicit).
Clearly, some of the six detainees could be tried on publicly available information. For example, KSM admitted responsibility for the September 11th attacks in his CSRT. Stating “I was responsible for the 9/11 operation, from A to Z,”.
Appeals- If convicted all of these detainees will enjoy an automatic appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review. They also will have optional appeals to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The accused are:
1. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed- “the mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks by proposing the operational concept to Usama bin Laden as early as 1996, obtaining approval and funding from Usama bin Laden for the attacks, overseeing the entire operation, and training the hijackers in all aspects of the operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
2. Walid Bin ‘Attash- “is alleged to have administered an al Qaeda training camp in Logar, Afghanistan where two of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers were trained. He is also alleged to have traveled to Malaysia in 1999 to observe airport security by U. S. air carriers to assist in formulating the hijacking plan.”
3. Ramzi Binalshibh- “alleged to have lived with the Hamburg, Germany, al Qaeda cell where three of the Sept. 11 hijackers resided. It is alleged that Binalshibh was originally selected by Usama bin Laden to be one of the Sept. 11 hijackers and that he made a “martyr video” in preparation for the operation. He was unable to obtain a US visa and, therefore, could not enter the United States as the other hijackers did. In light of this, it is alleged that Binalshibh assisted in finding flight schools for the hijackers in the United States, and continued to assist the conspiracy by engaging in numerous financial transactions in support of the Sept. 11 operation.”
4. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali- “alleged to have included sending approximately $120,000 to the hijackers for their expenses and flight training, and facilitating travel to the United States for nine of the hijackers.”
5. Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi- “alleged to have assisted and prepared the hijackers with money, western clothing, traveler’s checks and credit cards. He is also alleged to have facilitated the transfer of thousands of dollars between the accounts of alleged Sept. 11 hijackers and himself on Sept. 11, 2001.”
6. Mohamed al Kahtani- “alleged to have attempted to enter the United States on August 4, 2001, through Orlando International Airport where he was denied entry. It is also alleged that al Kahtani carried $2,800 in cash and had an itinerary listing a phone number associated with Hawsawi.”
Murder, attempted murder, material support, conspiracy and spying are the charges against Omar Khadr who recently faced a military commission which heard challenges to its jurisdiction. I’ve previously blogged in detail about those charges here. As I’ve previously noted, Khadr comes from a dedicated al Qaeda family, with a family tradition of terrorism. Abdurahman Khadr, Omar’s brother boldly stated “I admit it that we are an al-Qaeda family. We had connections to al-Qaeda.” and later revealed that he had been “raised to become a suicide bomber.”
Khadr’s father Ahmad was killed in a targeted missile strike(others say in a shootout) in Pakistan. Prior to his death, Ahmad Khadr was a long time member of al Qaeda and rose to the highest levels of the al Qaeda terrorist network, commanding a region of Logar per the direct orders of Osama Bin Laden. Ahmad Khadr contributed to al Qaeda in the form of financial support and personnel assistance to further the organization’s international terrorism objectives. In particular, he encouraged his sons to join al Qaed and to carry out its work. The recently released “Book of 120 Martyrs” an al Qaeda recruiting tool states that Khadr married a Palestinian who “shared with him his march to jihad, and Allah granted them several sons who shared this long, tiresome march with him.” Omar Khadr heeded his father’s call.
Omar Khadr and his family made yearly trips to the bin Laden compound in Jalalabad Afghanistan, meeting with bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and other senior leaders. Khadr, not only met with senior leadership, he also attended various training camps learning the tradecraft of an international terrorist. He was trained to use rocket propelled grenades, rifles, pistols, hand grenades and explosives. He is alleged to have put his skills to use converting land mines to IED’s, planting IED’s along U.S. military routes of travel, and conducting surveillance against U.S. forces in preparation for future attacks.
In fact recently released footage shows Khadr making and emplacing an IED.
Also, footage from Iraq, gives us an idea of the other type of al Qaeda training which Khadr was likely to have gone through (Hat tip to BlackFive). That training shows children learning kidnapping and assasination, the type of conduct for which we wouldn’t hesitate to try a minor as an adult for in a domestic court.
Of course as readers know, Khadr concluded his al Qaeda tour of duty in a firefight on July 27, 2002, where he threw a grenade killing Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer of the 3rd Special Forces Group and partially blinding Sergeant First Class Layne Morris. In the firefight Khadr was shot four times by U.S. forces who then stepped over the bodies of their comrades to save his life. He was detained, provided medical treatment and sent to Guantanamo.
Khadr’s attorney’s make the argument that he was entitled to kill Sergeant Speer because Speer was a lawful target, and Khadr’s actions were not a war crime at the time he commited them. Furthemore, Defense lawyers and a UN representative have argued that if the U.S. tries Khadr, it will be a violation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, points which Colonel Davis, the former Chief Prosecutor took issue with in the comments here. Davis states:
1) The issue the protocol and lists of countries stating opposition to the recruitment of child soldiers does not speak to their conduct, it speaks to bans on recruitment.
2) Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child places limits on punishment, not prosecution.
3) The U.N. sanctioned Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Statue in Article 7 allowed for jurisdiction over persons 15 years of age.
Abstract:
Unlike traditional war in which soldiers fought soldiers and tanks attacked tanks, the “unseen enemy in the dark shadows of the back alleys” characterizes the post 9/11 world. Commanders are facing many challenges targeting battlefield combatants. What increasingly complicates the battlefield commanders’ dilemma in determining the status of the individual standing before him is what we describe and define in the article as “voluntary human shields”. Commanders are faced with many decision points once terrorist organizations or enemy forces introduce human shields into the equation. Battlefield commanders must determine whether the human shield is friend, foe, or innocent bystander. After making this determination, the commander then must consider the impact of potential civilian casualties or the perception that civilian casualties occurred. These decisions often have to be made by the commander on the ground with little to no time to contemplate the pros and cons of the decision.
We have chosen to address this issue for multiple reasons: commanders demand clear criteria regarding the status of those in the “zone of combat”; the innocent civilian must be protected; international law demands the soldier be trained in distinguishing between the innocent and non-innocent and the community supporting terrorist organizations must know that the truly innocent will be protected (to the greatest extent possible). The security of those individuals on the battlefield depends on the analysis of the commander. The commander must assess the security rights of the individuals on the field of battle (guided by international humanitarian law) versus the security of the soldiers he commands and the security of the state he represents. The commander needs tools to toss into his proverbial pack to take with him on the battlefield. In the article, we assert the “tools” must consist, at a minimum, of the following factors: 1) intelligence information; 2) analysis of the conduct of the specific individual; 3) battlefield circumstances at the relevant time; 4) the commanders’ prior experience; 5) the conduct of additional individuals in the surrounding area. Senior military commanders, policy and decision makers, academics, the general public and those supporting terrorists must address this issue. Otherwise, the killing of innocent civilians is as inevitable as the tragic death of a soldier unequipped to determine “who is the enemy”.
Abstract:
In response to the continued terror threat facing the United States, counterterrorism measures must be developed that are both effective and meet accountability standards. This paper approaches the issue by: (1) proposing a matrix facilitating the measurement of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a particular counterterrorism measure; and (2) proposing an accountability matrix for measuring the effectiveness of particular measures. The paper’s central focus is developing criteria for measuring effective counterterrorism - premised on the rule of law, policy considerations, and the limits of power. If utilized, these criteria will provide empirical evidence that particular counterterrorism measures in actuality contribute to effective and legal counterterrorism.
After the conclusion of the Saddam Hussein trial, which was perhaps the messiest trial in legal history, I was invited by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, to make a presentation to his staff about the best ways an international criminal court can maintain control of a war crimes trial in the face of a defendant or defense counsel who seeks to disrupt the proceedings. I subsequently was invited to speak about this important issue to the judges and prosecutors of the Rwanda Tribunal and Cambodia Tribunal. The text of my presentation is available on the ICC’s website: http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_guest_lectures.html and has subsequently been published as: Michael P. Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Trials, 39 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 155-170 (2007).
Because of the political context and widespread publicity, former leaders on trial such as Charles Taylor, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Vojislav Seselj, are more likely than ordinary defendants to perceive that they do not stand a chance of obtaining an acquittal by playing by the rules. Instead, such individuals will often attempt to derail the proceedings, hoping for a negotiated solution such as a pardon or amnesty. They may try to hijack the trial, hoping to transform themselves through their political diatribes into heroic martyrs in the eyes of their followers. And at the same time, they may seek to discredit the tribunal, hoping to provoke the judges into inappropriately harsh responses which will make the process appear patently unfair. For this reason, major war crimes trials are often perceived as extremely messy or worse, completely out of control. When the Charles Taylor trial began last summer, there were indications that it would follow that pattern, as Taylor made inflammatory speeches, fired his lawyer, and sought to represent himself at the trial’s first session.
As Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial, observed sixty years ago, war crimes trials, whether before international tribunals or domestic courts, seek to establish a credible historic record of abuses and elevate the rule of law over the force of might, thereby facilitating the restoration of peace and the transition to democracy. While tolerating dissent is a healthy manifestation of a democratic government, a courtroom is not an arena in which dissension, particularly of a disruptive nature, may supplant, or even take precedence over, the task of administering justice. Unlike other forms of acceptable political expression, a disruptive defendant or defense lawyer who interferes with the “grandeur of court procedure” (as Hannah Arendt once described the judicial process) threatens the proper administration of criminal justice in several fundamental ways. First, disruptive conduct renders it more difficult for the defendant and any co-defendants to obtain a fair trial. Second, it hampers the court’s ability to facilitate the testimony of victims and other witnesses. And third, it undermines the public’s confidence in and respect for the legal process.
With this in mind, the Special Court for Sierra Leone wisely held in Prosecutor v. Norman (2005) that the defendant’s right to employ disruptive tactics which seek to discredit the judicial process must give way to the tribunal’s obligation to protect “the integrity of the proceedings” and “to ensure that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute.” Following the recipe outlined in my presentation/article, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has taken appropriate actions to make sure that the Charles Taylor trial avoids the missteps of the messy war crimes trials of the past. For example, the Tribunal has required that Taylor be represented by counsel, rather than allow him to use self-representation to turn the trial into a circus. And it has provided Taylor and his counsel detailed warnings of the incremental and calibrated Judicial responses they can expect to encounter if they engage in disruptive conduct.
Based on my impressions from watching the live feed of the Taylor trial at http://www.sc-sl.org/ it appears that the Tribunal has succeeded. Defendant Charles Taylor is behaving himself quite admirably in the courtroom, and at the same time is taking a constructive part in his own defense. He is seen constantly writing and often passing sticky notes to his lawyer, Courtenay Griffiths, who uses them during cross-examination. Taylor stands respectfully when the judges enter the courtroom, and has done nothing remotely disruptive - though his very presence is of course intimidating to witnesses who fear for their lives and are under the heaviest security imaginable. The press made a big deal that Taylor blew a kiss to his daughter sitting in the public gallery viewing to the trial on the first day, and he occasionally stares people down in the public gallery, but for the most part he seems to be quietly paying attention to what’s going on in the court.
Taylor’s new legal team has been doing an impressive job. British Barrister Courtenay Griffiths is quite tough on the witness, he grandstands from time to time, he tries to induce the witnesses into making exculpatory statements about his client, and he does his best to generate inconsistencies in their stories — basically he’s doing exactly what an outstanding defense attorney should be doing, which in turn bumps up the credibility of the entire process. The Taylor trial is animated - but within the ground rules of the court. This is a far cry from the Milosevic, Seselj and Saddam Trials, where the defendants and their counsel regularly disparaged the judges, interrupted witness testimony with outbursts, turned cross-examination into political diatribes, and staged frequent walk-outs, hunger strikes, and boycotts. It remains to be seen whether things will continue to go so well, but for now it does appear that the SCSL has learned from the lessons of the past and is setting a good precedent for the future.
The AIDP is the oldest association of criminal law specialists in the world and one of the oldest scientific associations. This blog serves as a discussion site for all things law, with a focus upon criminal law, comparative criminal justice, international criminal law, international humanitarian law, war crimes, international criminal tribunals, human rights and counterterrorism law & policy.
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