Note: External links, forms and search boxes may not function within this collection
This is an archived Web site from the Library of Congress
http://www.professorgeradin.blogs.com/
Archived: 01/03/2008 at 19:35:25
First (08/02/2007)
Previous
#11 of 40
Next 
Last (12/01/2009) 
Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance
The Liberalization of State Monopolies in the European Union (EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS Volume 23)
The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services
D. Sokol, from the antitrust and competition policy blog, had the great idea of asking a group of experts to pick the best antitrust scholarship of the year. See here for more.
See link below for the results.
By far and large, the winners are William Page and John Lopatka, for their book entitled The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed last week. Hereafter are the relevant competition law excerpts.
Article 2B (p. 5) / Rules on competition (para. 76; p. 28-29)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/c_306/c_30620071217en00410132.pdf
Protocol on the internal market and competition
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/c_306/c_30620071217en01540154.pdf
Protocol on services of general interest
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/c_306/c_30620071217en01560157.pdf
RULES ON COMPETITION (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/c_306/c_30620071217en00410132.pdf ):
76) In Article 85, the following new paragraph 3 shall be added:
‘3. The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of agreement in respect of which the Council has adopted a regulation or a directive pursuant to Article 83(2)(b).’.
77) Article 87 shall be amended as follows:
(a) in paragraph 2, the following sentence shall be added at the end of point (c):
‘Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision repealing this point.’;
(b) in paragraph 3, the following words shall be added at the end of point (a): ‘, and of the regions referred to in Article 299, in view of their structural, economic and social situation;’.
78) In Article 88, the following new paragraph 4 shall be added:
‘4. The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of State aid that the Council has, pursuant to Article 89, determined may be exempted from the procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of this Article.’.
The Editors of the Competition Law Journal are pleased to present:
The 2nd Junior UK Competition Practitioners Conference
at the Competition Commission
on Friday 7 December 2007 at 2:00 pm
This conference is open to all those involved in UK competition law, economics and policy, whether in practice, in public service or in academia. Due to the nature of the event and the capacity constraints, we have decided to impose the following conditions:
On the basis of expressions of interest to date we anticipate that demand will be extremely high. Please do contact us as soon as possible at julie.hamilton@catribunal.org.uk. Subject to the above, places will be given on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. If you have already expressed an interest in attending, you must still apply.
Continue reading "Conference Announcement - 2nd Junior UK Competition Practictioners Conference" »
I am a longtime fan of G. Monti's work (LSE). I made extensive use of his illuminating CMLR paper on collective dominance ("The Scope of Collective Dominance Under Article 82 EC", (2001) 38(1) Common Market Law Review, 131).
The good news: G. Monti has launched a promising weblog, the "Competition Law Board". See here.
Please find below the slides presented by Marisa Tierno-Centella (from the Commission) today at the GCLC lunch talk.
Download settlements_package_tierno_centella_29th_lunch_talk_of_the_gclc.pdf
There are still a number of free seats available for the GCLC lunch talk tomorrow. Would I be a rational market player, I would price discriminate to sell the remaining tickets. Yet, if I did that, I would probably price below costs (our tickets cost 25€), and could face charges of predation on the Brussels market for antitrust events of less than 2 hours. Of course, I assume here that the GCLC holds a dominant position, which in my view is slightly presumptuous.
To market my tickets, I am thus left mere traditional advertisement means: "Please come numerous tomorrow, by filling in the below registration form. Settlements are The big issue today in EC antitrust law".
Trainees and officials from four Directorates-General of the European Commission – Competition, Internal Market and Services, Taxation and Custom Union, and Trade – are jointly organising a workshop on 14 December 2007 at the European Commission (Berlaymont building, 7th floor) from 9h30 to 12h30. The theme of the workshop is market definitions and "like products" in competition law, internal market law, tax law and trade law.
The workshop will be chaired by Mr. Stefan AMARASINHA (DG Trade and World Trade Institute) and will be structured as follows:
(1) an introductory lectio magistralis delivered by Professor Jacques BOURGEOIS (College of Europe and WilmerHale LLP)
(2) separate group work on an assigned case; a specialist from each DG will chair and provide guidance to each of the four groups:
- Mr. Stefan AMARASINHA, DG Trade
- Mr. Jan FOLTMAR, DG Taxation and Customs Union
- Dr. Oliver KOCH, DG Competition
- Mr. Peter SMITH, DG Internal Market and Services
(3) Final panel discussions where the Commission officials will play the role of rapporteurs of the four groups
Berlaymont building, 7th floor. European Commission. 200, rue de la Loi/Wetstraat. Brussels
métro: Schuman. Free of charges. Register at: workshop4dg@gmail.com
For more on the issue of like products, see here the paper posted by A. Emch on the unavoidable ssrn.
I recently completed a paper on excessive pricing under EC law. Please find below the abstract.
Excessive pricing is an area of competition law which differs significantly from most others. First, the notion of excessive pricing has failed to stimulate much economic analysis in Europe. This is in great part due to the fact that most studies on the economics of abusive pricing have focused on exclusionary pricing behavior, as such abuses are more frequent than exploitative ones. Moreover, excessive pricing is an antitrust offence only in a limited number of jurisdictions. There is also a widely accepted view that competition authorities are ill-suited to carry out price controls, a task which should be better left to sector-specific regulators. Because they intervene on an ad hoc basis, i.e. to sanction specific anti-competitive behavior, competition authorities cannot easily transform themselves into price regulators. Price regulation is a long-term effort which requires quasi-permanent supervision.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to review the case-law of the EU and of some of its Member States dealing with the control of excessive prices. This paper will also discuss current enforcement trends by the European Commission and National Competition Authorities, including recent cases and policy pronouncements by senior competition law officials. As will be seen, there is a growing consensus among competition agencies that controlling prices should be limited to exceptional circumstances. Moreover, where such circumstances justify them, given the inherent risks of costly mistakes and unintended adverse effects, price controls should be based on a sound economic analysis of market circumstances and carried out with the utmost caution.
Damien
Speakers are Gerwin Van Gerven of Linklaters and Marisa Tierno-Centella from DG COMP. See link below for registration form.
Recent Comments