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DEADLY EMBRACE:

PAKISTAN, AMERICA, AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL JIHAD

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PROCEDINGS

MR. O’HANLON: Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to Brookings. I’m Michael O’Hanlon. I have the honor of introducing Bruce Riedel today, and also Rick Inderfurth, as we begin a discussion of Bruce’s new book, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad*.

I’m just going to say a few brief words of introduction, and then Bruce will explain his book and some of its main arguments, also here from the podium. And then we’ll settle into a bit of a discussion where Rick will kindly interview, moderate, ask Bruce various questions exploring some more dimensions of the book. And then we’ll turn to you, and I’ll try to moderate a discussion that involves your questions, as well.

So, very briefly, I think most people in this room know very well our author, as well as Rick Inderfurth, and a brief word on each.

Rick, as you know, was Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in the Clinton Administration. He’s been a professor at George Washington University and is now the inaugural and, hopefully, longstanding holder of the Wadhwani Chair on U.S.-India relations at CSIS. And we’re delighted to have him speaking today with Bruce and, again, in the discussion period that will follow Bruce’s presentation.

Bruce Riedel advised four presidents on South Asia policy.
He has been at Brookings now long enough to write two books. And the way I think of Bruce's books -- the first being *The Search for al-Qaeda* and the second now, of course, *Deadly Embrace* -- is that they are the most concise, pithy, and well-informed books on terrorism, you know, very good literature that has a lot of very good books. And yet, if you want the pithiest and most up-to-date and also most policy relevant, I always turn to Bruce Riedel and I hope you will, too.

I'm glad to see that you're all here today. I think of, for example, Steve Coll, who has written tremendous books on this part of the world. If you want 700 pages of detail, read Steve. If you want the same information in 145 pages, read Bruce. And this is not a slight at Steve, who's a tremendous author and a Pulitzer Prize winner, but the gift the Bruce has for pithiness is really extraordinary.

On top of that, this book is up to date and carries us well into the policy review period when Bruce was chairing the Pakistan-Afghanistan policy review for President Obama, which, as you know, he did in the early months of the Obama Administration two years ago, and also thereafter, during the period when we’ve been surging in Afghanistan, during the period when we’ve been dealing with a lot of political instability and transition inside Pakistan as well.

And so, if you read this book -- and I'll just say one more
word before turning the podium over to Bruce -- you'll see that it’s structured in a form of several chapters that are about various individual’s jihads, starting with some earlier history and then President Zia, and working up through Omar and Osama and global jihad. And so it’s really, again, a pithy, very clear, and yet very detailed history of what has happened within Pakistan as well as the U.S.-Pakistan relationship throughout the last several decades, and, again with a tremendous chapter, at the end, that I think is the most provocative, useful, and fresh on how to think about future policy towards Pakistan of anything that I’ve read across the entire literature.

And so, without further ado, please join me in welcoming and thanking Bruce Riedel for this great book. (Applause)

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you, Mike, for that very, very kind introduction. And thank all of you for coming out on a beautiful winter day in Washington, D.C. (Laughter)

Before I talk about the book, I want to make a few more thank-yous, since this is the official book launch for Deadly Embrace. So bear with me as I thank a few more people.

First, I want to thank President Barack Obama. Two years ago, almost exactly to this day, he called me at home and asked me to chair his strategic review of American policies towards Afghanistan and
Pakistan. That strategic review and that phone call and my conversations with him became the genesis of this book.

As I looked back on that strategic review, after I’d completed it in March of 2009, it became clear to me that Pakistan really is at the top of the list of American foreign policy challenges in the 21st century. And yet, it’s a country about which most Americans know surprisingly little and many Americans have many misconceptions about.

I should say right from the beginning, of course, that this book is my book. It in no way reflects the policies of President Obama or the United States government. It should not be interpreted in any way as reflecting the policies or the thinking of the United States government.

Secondly, I’d like to thank Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who provided the title for the book, Deadly Embrace, and with whom I was able to spend many, many years negotiating and meeting with Pakistanis, and in the years since, thinking about it and talking about it, and getting his insights.

And I’d like to thank the rest of my colleagues at Brookings, including Mike, director of research; Martin Indyk, vice president for Foreign Policy; Ken Pollack, who couldn’t be with us today, director of the Saban Center; the editors and staff at Brookings Press; my publicist; and especially my research assistant, Aysha Chowdhry, who helped me
through every stage of this book. Without the Brookings staff, without the
superb atmosphere that Brookings provides, I could not have written this
book.

Third, I want to thank many, many other Americans, too
numerous to name -- diplomats, spies, soldiers, scholars -- who have
given me the benefit of their insights and of their experiences in Pakistan
over the years. Some of them are with us today, including former
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rick Inderfurth, Ambassador
Bill Milam, Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, and a host of others. They
don’t necessarily agree with all I’ve written. In fact, I know they don’t
agree with all that I’ve written, but I’ve benefited enormously from listening
to them.

And finally, and perhaps most importantly, I want to thank
the many Pakistanis -- dozens, if not hundreds -- who have given me their
advice and their thoughts, either in person calling on me here or over the
years, the CIA and the State Department and the White House, or through
their writings, or through those hundreds of unsolicited e-mails I get every
day, not all of which are all that pleasant to read, but which are filled with
advice and thoughts.

And I have to single out one in particular, the late Benazir
Bhutto. Her two books and my numerous meetings with her provided me
with more insights into Pakistan, its troubles, and its hopeful future, than anything else I’ve read. And her courage in the face of the dark forces that beset Pakistan should serve as an inspiration for all of us, as we try to think of a better way for Pakistan.

Pakistan is a uniquely important country in many, many ways. It has the sixth largest population in the world today: a little over 180 million people, according to the United Nations. It is the second largest Muslim country in the world today by way of population, and will probably be the first by 2050, if not sooner.

Even anticipating a slight decrease in fertility rates, Pakistan will have 335 million people by the year 2050. It is also the first state created after the Second World War. The first of what would turn out to be over 120 since then, and the first and so far only country created in the world specifically to be a homeland for Muslims, a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia.

It’s also got the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. If not now, soon it will have the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, surpassing the United Kingdom. And judging by the new nuclear reactors that are coming online and the pace of production, Pakistan is on a course to be the fourth largest nuclear weapons state in the world, ahead of France.
Its nuclear proliferation activities are infamous and famous. It is a unique nuclear proliferant state in that it has both been the recipient of other countries’ nuclear proliferation and a proliferator to third countries. Today it is, unfortunately, the home to more terrorist organizations than any other country in the world. Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Josh Mohammed, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban, and a host of other groups whose names continue to change, all of whom have their own agendas, but almost all of whom call Pakistan home for at least their leadership.

On every issue that matters to Americans, and I would say more than Americans, to the citizens of the globe, Pakistan in the 21st century will be crucial. Issues like nuclear proliferation, nuclear war, terrorism, the future of the jihad, and, most importantly, the future of democracy in the Islamic world.

And yet, this is a country which if you go to the bookstores, you’ll find surprisingly few books about it. Or if you go to library shelves, you’ll find very, very few books about. There is tremendous ignorance. Compare the amount of literature that you can find in Pakistan to its two neighbors, what I call the two “I”s to the east and west, Iran and India. Iran and India get far more print than Pakistan does, despite its importance.
This book then tries to look at Pakistan today in light of this ignorance and in the face of Pakistan’s importance. What I try to do in this book is look at the intersection of three separate issues or three separate narratives and see how those three issues come together to produce the uniquely combustible Pakistan we face today.

The first issue is Pakistan’s own domestic politics, the second is the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship, and the third is the growth and development of the global jihad movement. What I’d like to do for the next 15 minutes or so then is talk about each of these, talk about Pakistan today, and then conclude with a few comments about what the United States can do to help Pakistan to help itself.

First, Pakistani politics. Pakistani politics is a story studded with mysteries: murders that are never resolved; people who leave the scene or who come back to the scene who have been judged; to have been thrown out for good -- Nawaz Sharif -- and come back; those who are judged to be in power in perpetuity -- Pervez Musharraf -- and where thrown out. It is dominated by a struggle at two levels.

At one level is the struggle between the generals and the politicians, a very unhealthy civil-military relationship since the 1950s. And at another, a struggle between modernists, moderates, indeed secularists versus Islamists of a whole variety of filters and sides -- some
more moderate, some radical, some extreme.

This very complex interaction of civil-military relations, and relations between relatively secular -- although they hate to be called that - - and extremist Islamist parties lies at the heart of Pakistan’s political struggle. Over the years, the generals have come into power four times and, by and large, the generals intended to bolster the Islamists. Certainly the most memorable of Pakistan’s military dictators, General Zia-ul-Haq, did that in the 1980s. And in the process, they’ve built up the power of Pakistan’s own internal security forces, especially the Interservices Intelligence Directory.

Zia, for example, inherited an ISI in 1978 that had 2,000 employees. In 1988, it had 40,000 employees and a billion-dollar budget. He also used it to begin building the modern global Islamic jihad. By conservative figures -- from those in the ISI at the time, who ran the war in Afghanistan -- the ISI trained somewhere around 90,000 Afghans in the war to fight the Soviet Union, including Mullah Omar.

But one of the things that I think is most striking about Pakistani politics and yet often lost in the forest of military dictatorships of the ISI, and of a press system which active, is anything but responsible -- is the constant struggle of the Pakistani people to come back to democracy.
Pakistan is not a country like Tunisia or Egypt that has had dictators now for 60 years, with little or not resistance. Pakistan is a country in which the yearning for democracy has pushed the dictators out of office over and over again. Unfortunately, for the Pakistani people, the civilian leaders they’ve often got have not lived up to the hopes of the Pakistani people. And that’s as true today as it has been on so many occasions in the past. But I think you miss a lot in thinking about Pakistan if you don’t recognize this underlying constant push for democracy and rule of law and for a system of accountability.

Secondly, let me turn to the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship. If the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship could be turned into a TV soap opera, I guarantee you it would be number one across the world. It’s a great story. The United States and Pakistan have these spectacular highs when we’re deeply in love with each other, followed almost immediately by deep lows in which we accused each other of all kinds of things. The United States sanctions Pakistan every conceivable way it can think of. It’s also filled with murder, like General Zia’s death in 1989, and unexplained events.

The rollercoaster of U.S.-Pakistani relationship that goes up and down over the last decades is almost, in every case, built around a great secret project which remains a secret for about a month and then
becomes the best known secret in the world. This is what I mean. If this was a TV soap opera, you’d be glued to the screen.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the great projects were the U-2 base in Peshawar, which was a secret to Americans, but known to everybody in Pakistan as Little Reston. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was Nixon’s secret trip to China and Pakistan as the back door to Beijing. In the 1980s, it was the war against the Soviet Union, a covert operation that had nothing covert about it and which has even produced at least one good movie. And in this decade, it’s been the war against al-Qaeda and the secret drone strikes, which even the President jokes about on occasion. So much for a secret.

The one consistency in the American policy approach to Pakistan is we’ve had a love affair with every military dictator. Every general that’s come along has been supported by the United States. It’s a remarkably bipartisan record. Republicans and Democrats may not have agreed on many things in foreign policy over the last 50 years, but they’ve supported dictatorship in Pakistan continuously.

My favorite example, John F. Kennedy invited Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military dictator, to have a state dinner at Mount Vernon. The only time in our country’s history that our Founding Father’s home has been used for a state dinner was for a Pakistani general. If you don’t
believe me, go up there some day and you’ll see there are pictures.

These presidents have adopted this policy always for good short-term reasons. There was always a logical reason to do it, but the long-term implication of this has been to undermine civil-military relations in Pakistan, undermine civil institutions, encourage dangerous efforts by the generals, and produce much of the mess we have today.

We have undermined Pakistani democracy and in the process have alienated the Pakistani people. When Barack Obama was elected President two years ago, the United States got a boost in popularity virtually around the world. In one place he got zero -- no boost at all -- was Pakistan. The legacy of 60 years had come home to roost.

Third, let me talk a little bit about the rise of the global jihad because, in many ways, this is the centerpiece of the book, and the product of the first two factors working together.

The modern Islamic global jihad movement -- and that’s a movement, a statement, a definition used by the modern Islamic jihad, not one that I created -- roots can be found in Zia’s Pakistan. And, in particular, at one individual, a Palestinian named Abdullah Azzam. And I devote several pages of the book to charting the course and the history of Abdullah Azzam because he really is a remarkable individual. This is a man who was Osama bin Laden’s first mentor, the man who gave him his
ideological world view. He was the co-founder of the Services Bureau, the organization that would morph in time into al-Qaeda.

He was also a co-founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group that attacked Mumbai two years ago; is also one of the most important influences on the Palestinian group Hamas back home in Palestine. His thinking, the notion that jihad should not be national, but jihad should be global in scope, and his prescription that the solution to the imbalance between the far enemy and the jihad -- his martyrdom operations -- have proven to have major influence on our world today.

Today the global jihad is a syndicate of various terrorist organizations, like al-Qaeda, like the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Let me be clear, this is not a monolith. To apply the standards of American organizational thinking is to miss this completely. This is a group of fellow-minded individuals who have no single leader, no single agenda, but who increasingly operate and cooperate together on the operational level. And all the more, every day, become more and more radicalized.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is the perfect example. Lashkar-e-Taiba, an organization that started out with a relatively narrow agenda vis-à-vis India, has now become a member of the global jihad. It collaborated, for example, with al-Qaeda in two plots in Copenhagen, Denmark. It fights
with the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. It even sent fighters to Iraq in the last decade. It attacks American and Jewish targets and, even better, American-Jewish targets together in Mumbai. And yet, it also retains intimate ties to the Pakistani Intelligence Service. It is kind of a classic example of what has happened to the global jihad today.

Pakistan today, as we all know from reading the newspapers, is a country facing severe stress, perhaps the most severe stress in its history. It is at war with part of the jihadist Frankenstein that it helped to create. The Pakistani army today is engaged in the most serious counterinsurgency operations it has ever engaged in against the militancy. In six of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas today, the Pakistani army is engaged in a real war. It is taking serious casualties. It is imposing serious costs on the jihadist menace.

And yet, at the same time, other parts of the jihadist Frankenstein are still tolerated in Pakistan. It is this unique and complex situation in which Pakistan is both victim and patron of terror that is so unique today.

You add the worst natural disaster in the country’s history, extreme economic problems, and extraordinarily poor governance together and you have the makings of a potential disaster. The cost to Pakistanis is enormous, as we saw in the murder of the governor of
Punjab, Salman Taseer, just 10 days ago.

This weekend, the Pakistan Institute for Peace released figures on the state of terror in Pakistan in 2010. Quoting to their report, “There were 2,113 terrorist attacks in Pakistan last year.” No country in the world even comes close to that. Almost 3,000 people died and 6,000 were wounded.

The good news: that’s about a 10 percent decline from 2009. The bad news: more of these terrorist attacks are now taking place in the Punjab and in the Sindh, in the heartland of Pakistan, than we’ve ever seen today. Pakistan today is a country fighting for its soul, fighting for its future. One way to think about it is fighting between those who remain loyal to Mohammed Jinnah’s vision of a modern, moderate democratic Pakistan versus those I refer to as the dark forces, who want to convert Pakistan into a jihadist state, an extremist state, and a violent state.

I spend one chapter in the book looking at what happened if they succeed in thinking about the unthinkable. What if Pakistan became a jihadist state? It is not imminent, it is not inevitable, it is probably not the most likely course for Pakistan, but it is possible. Possible in a way it has never been before.

Such a development would pose, I would argue, the worst
possible nightmare for the United States in the 21st century. Imagine a jihadist state with the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world. And if that doesn’t scare you at night, then you’re watching too many horror movies.

What is to be done? Let me turn to this last. Well, first of all, let’s have humility. It’s not up to Americans. Americans are not going to decide Pakistan’s future. Based on our track record over the last 65 years, the first and most important thing we should do is no more harm. Let Pakistan be Pakistan.

In the book I devote a chapter to recommendations on where to go from here, some are bureaucratic and may seem small, some are economic about trade, tariffs, and other issues. I’m happy to discuss all of those in the question-and-answer period with Rick and with all of you.

What I want to talk about, though, in closing is two central recommendations. First, whatever else we do, don’t undermine the democratically elected civilian leadership of Pakistan. And above all, do not undermine the democratic process in Pakistan. The politicians we are dealing with are weak, corrupt, and, more often than not, ineffective, but they are the best of bad alternatives.

It is always tempting to go to the army -- to go to the chief of army staff to get a quick and rapid answer, but every time we do that we
undermine the very institutions we are trying to strengthen in Pakistan today. In the wake of the problems we’ve seen in the last year, there are already those who are saying, shouldn’t we bring back Musharraf or find a new Musharraf? That is the wrong answer.

The generals should stay in their barracks. They should be professional military officers, that’s what they’re good at. They do not run the country well. They are not the answer. All too often in the past, they have been the problem. Warts and all, democracy in Pakistan is still what we should support, not individuals, but a process.

Secondly, the United States now should engage in creative and dynamic regional diplomacy aimed at normalizing Pakistan’s borders, both east and west, and its situation in South Asia. I’ve already told you why Pakistan is unique in so many areas, but there’s one more.

Pakistan, for a large country, has unrecognized borders east and west. In the East, the line of control between Azad Kashmir and Kashmir and Jammu remains an unrecognized international border. And in the West, the Durand Line, the line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has never been recognized by an Afghan government. Why should it? It was drawn arbitrarily by a British civilian more than 100 years ago.

But it’s not normal and it’s not healthy for a country to not have borders. to not have secure borders it can live within. We keep
asking Pakistan to secure its border with Afghanistan. It’s difficult to do that when the Afghan government still fails to recognize the legitimacy of the Durand Line.

What should the United States do? Well, first thing it should not do is appoint a high-level special representative with the job of securing Pakistan’s borders. We need to do things that are very un-American in our diplomacy: subtle, sophisticated, and behind-the-scenes. (Laughter)

Yep, most of you don’t think it can be done. I’m the eternal optimist, I think it can be done.

For the last three or four years such diplomacy has been impossible. Impossible because most in the region assumed that America was getting ready to cut and run and that we were on the verge of losing the war in Afghanistan and that the victory of the Taliban was all but inevitable. I hope -- and what I’m hearing from General Petraeus, and what you’re hearing from General Petraeus, and what I heard from Vice President Biden when he went to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is that the momentum has shifted and that we’re stabilizing Afghanistan. That’s an essential step to empower diplomacy. But once that step is taken, we need to raise our sights and try to develop a diplomacy that tries to normalize South Asia.
We’ve already made progress in the last two years in the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Those two capitals now talk to each other, not yet as friends, but far more effectively than they have in the past. That dialogue is essential for any process for reconciliation in Afghanistan. If our complaint is that the ISI continues to harbor the Afghan Taliban, then the answer for a political process has to include the ISI. If you want to talk to the Quetta Shura, you’re going have to talk to the people who know the telephone number for the Quetta Shura.

It won’t be easy. It will be very difficult to do, but if we want to shut down the sanctuaries in Pakistan, if we want to isolate the extremists, if we want to defeat al-Qaeda, Pakistan has to be at the center of that.

Secondly, we need to think about Pakistan’s border with India. India, after all, is the issue that has obsessed Pakistan for 60 years. Anyone who goes back and looks at how Pakistan was created, and at partition, would understand that obsession.

Sure, Pakistan has done a lot to create an enemy in India, but we’re past that point. Paranoids do have enemies and these two countries are now enemies. The United States should not engage in mediation between India and Pakistan. That would fail in a nanosecond. But what we should do is try to support the bilateral process between
these two countries. Let’s try to restart what President Zardari tried to do in early and mid-2008. Small steps to reopen trade, to reopen transportation links, to develop air service between Islamabad and New Delhi, hoping that small steps will lead to bigger steps.

General Musharraf, after all, after he tried nuclear blackmail, a small conventional war, terrorism, also turned to diplomacy. He may have been a slow learner, but in the end he learned that the solution was a back channel between New Delhi and Islamabad. My suspicion is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh every night thinks, I wish I’d grabbed Musharraf’s offer more energetically and taken it to the bank when I had the chance.

The United States cannot make this happen, but it can help with subtle, sophisticated, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy because this is the big idea America should stand for in South Asia. A South Asia that puts behind it the wars of the last half-century and begins to thinking about South Asia that is a shining South Asia. Not just for India, not just for Pakistan, and not just for Afghanistan, but for all the residents of the subcontinent.

Thank you very much for your attention. (Applause)

MR. INDERFURTH: Michael, thank you very much for the introductions. You had said that Bruce Riedel had been an advisor to four
American presidents, all true, but he has been advisor to many, many more assistant secretaries of state. And I was the beneficiary of one of those advisory relationships and I greatly appreciated it, so, Bruce, I’m delighted to be here at your request to basically interview you for a few minutes on the book.

I will tell you, I was his second choice. He invited Piers Morgan to be here to do the interview (Laughter), but he wasn’t available, so I’m the stand-in for the interview.

MR. RIEDEL: Good thing he doesn’t know about the other one. (Laughter)

MR. INDERFURTH: There probably were a few. This is a special treat for me because Bruce and I joined forces for many memorable trips to Pakistan while I was serving at State and he was at the NSC, including the visit of U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson to Islamabad and Kabul, to try to jumpstart a peace process to end the Afghan civil war and to get the Taliban to reign in bin Laden.

We had the so-called Mission Impossible 22-hour flight with Strobe Talbott and General Zinni to try to convince Prime Minister Sharif not to test nuclear weapons after the Indians had tested in May of 1998. We were also on President Clinton’s five-hour visit in March 2000, on that unmarked executive jet, to try to persuade General Musharraf -- who had
recently evicted Prime Minister Sharif from power -- to return to democratic rule.

Now, you'll notice in my description we did not have a very high success rate in our trips to persuade or convince or to end wars. So, what I am hoping, though -- even though we were not successful -- I am hoping that the book that Bruce has written will be very successful and I wish you great sales on a great book. So, we will proceed from there. All good efforts.

I'd like to just start with an easy question. You mentioned that Strobe came up with the name, *Deadly Embrace*? Tell us a little bit about that because a lot of people will fasten on the title of a book and they will want to know what's in the author's mind for choosing it. So tell us what *Deadly Embrace* means to you.

MR. RIEDEL: Thanks, Rick. And congratulations on your new posting. Rick has just left, after almost a decade, George Washington --

MR. INDERFURTH: Uh-huh.

MR. RIEDEL: -- to take up a new post as the India guru of India gurus in Washington, D.C.

*Deadly Embrace* is -- I think, embodies a very simple idea. The United States and Pakistan for 60 years now have been embraced
together, but the nature of that embrace has been deadly for both of them. Rather than an embrace that has produced powerfully strong and positive things, it is by and large -- not entirely -- but by and large, been a negative for both of them.

And yet there’s no way out. We’re stuck with each other, whether we like it or not. I suspect a lot of Pakistanis would prefer it not to be that way and if I were in their shoes, I would understand that. A lot of Americans would prefer not to be stuck with Pakistan, but we are. We have to try to do better in the next 60 years than we have in the last 60 years. And we have to make this not a deadly embrace, but a positive embrace.

MR. INDERFURTH: Let’s do hope. What I’m going to do is to call attention to some recent news articles or some headlines and ask Bruce to respond to those, drawing from his book and those things that have transpired since the book went to the Brookings press.

The first is, *Foreign Policy* magazine recently did a survey of the state of global terrorism, interviewing some 70 experts, and I think you were one of them. Mike, I think you probably were in that group as well. Unfortunately, it was a great deal of bad news for Pakistan in this survey. Overwhelmingly, the experts selected Pakistan as the country that posed the greatest threat to the West today, even more so than Iran. And a
majority also picked it as a country most likely to have its nukes end up in the hands of terrorists.

I think you’ve already said this somewhat in your remarks, but I assume that you agree with both of those points, or do you want to add to them?

MR. RIEDEL: Pakistan today is a country afflicted with a severe terrorist problem. I gave you the numbers. A comparable number in Afghanistan -- and Mike can correct me -- last year was less than 8,000 civilians killed and wounded, so 10,000 in Pakistan is disturbing. And yet it is also a country with a long track record of being in bed with many of these terrorist organizations. I’m not the only who’s said that. Many Pakistanis have said that. Read the book by Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States today, Husain Haqqani. Read Benazir Bhutto’s books.

This unique combination of patron state sponsor and victim is the challenge in front of us. We want to help Pakistan get out of the business of seeing terrorist groups as assets to be used, confront its terrorist threat and deal with it effectively.

Now, I said earlier, I’m an eternal optimist about Pakistan because it’s so easy to be a pessimist. You’re almost always right, but it takes you nowhere. Compared to where we were two years ago, Pakistan is fighting much more of the terrorist menace that it confronts today than it
was two years ago. If you had said to me two years ago the Pakistani army would be six of seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas trying to contain militancy, I would have told you you were dreaming. It’s not going to happen.

If I told you two years ago that the United States and Pakistan were locked in a heated argument over whether or not the Pakistani army should go into the seventh area, North Waziristan, I would have told you you are really dreaming in la-la land. It’s not going to happen. And it may never happen, but we have seen movement in the right direction.

The second thing I would say about this is that two years, three years ago, most Pakistanis were in denial about their problem. The terrorist problem, that was something that happened in the border lands. It was remote from their lives. Well, unfortunately, it’s not remote anymore. It’s in the Punjab. It’s in Karachi. And that has started to change Pakistani attitudes and you see it in Pakistani polls, and I include a lot of those polls in the book. You’re beginning to see what we’ve seen in other Muslim countries: a counter reaction to terror, a rebellion against it, and people standing up and saying no, we don’t want that.

It’s not a straight line. Very few things in Pakistan are straight lines. We’re zigging and zagging. But overall I think we’re moving
on this front in what promises to be a more hopeful direction.

MR. INDERFURTH: *Foreign Policy* had another question, a less obvious question than the other two that they surveyed. The question was who is the world’s most dangerous terrorist? And interestingly, one counterterrorist expert said not bin Laden or one of the usual suspects, but he said the terrorist whose actions precipitate a war between India and Pakistan, that would be the world’s most dangerous terrorist, and he was referring to another Mumbai-like attack. Do you agree with that?

MR. RIEDEL: I not only agree with it, as soon as I read *Foreign Policy* I said I wish I’d said that. It’s really a very good point.

We’ve been playing Russian roulette between India and Pakistan for the last decade, maybe longer than the last decade. Rick and I worked very hard to keep the Kargil War in 1999 from becoming a much larger war, which it threatened to do at one point. We tried very hard to keep it a conventional war, which in its last hours it appeared like it might not stay a conventional war. Since Kargil, we’ve had a series of horrendous, mass casualty terrorist attacks in India. We had the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that led to the mobilization of a million soldiers on the Indian-Pakistani border for most of the next year. I don’t know how close India and Pakistan came to war then. Ambassador Chamberlain could probably give us a good sense of how close they
came.

Then we’ve the series of attacks in Mumbai. We tend to focus on the last one, forget that there were two horrendous attacks in Mumbai before that. All of them postmarked back in Pakistan.

November 2008, the very first crisis this president dealt with after his election -- before his inauguration, but after his election -- was Mumbai. And it shaped and formed his perceptions of India and Pakistan in very, very important ways that could have started an escalatory ladder towards war. So far India has shown remarkable restraint and it’s not out of love for Mahatma Gandhi, although Indians do love Mahatma Gandhi, but it’s not out of love for Gandhi. It’s because Indian generals, politicians, and diplomats can’t figure out a way to strike back against Pakistan without starting that escalatory ladder.

I suspect we’ve probably reached the point of no return, where India’s patience next time isn’t going to ponder escalatory ladders. They’re going to find a way to strike back. That’s why I say it’s Russian roulette. Sooner or later we’re going to have a mass casualty terrorist attack and, as Foreign Policy put it, that terrorist may set the world on a course towards Armageddon.

That’s why I believe so strongly American diplomacy needs to do preventive work now. We need to try to find a way to help India and
Pakistan walk away from that kind of future. So far we’ve been very good at crisis management, but crisis management is not a policy prescription that you should rely on. Preventive diplomacy is a policy prescription that we should engage in today.

MR. INDERFURTH: Bruce, you talked in your remarks about the murder of Salman Taseer. *The Economist* had an article entitled “Pakistan’s Increasing Radicalization: Staring Into the Abyss.” They had another article, “The Crumbling Center: Pakistan’s Religious Mainstream Makes Common Cause With Militants.” Obviously that was a shocking assassination. How much should we see this as a defining moment? What do you make of the fact that his murderer was a part of the elite police force? Does that raise questions about other security concerns in Pakistan, including the security of their nuclear weapons? How much should we read into that assassination?

MR. RIEDEL: Well, it’s always dangerous to read too much into any single incident.

MR. INDERFURTH: Or too little?

MR. RIEDEL: Or too little. Pakistan, unfortunately, if you look over the last four or five years, is one horrendous act of terrorism after another, from the murder of Mrs. Bhutto to the murder of the governor and a spate of horrible suicide bombings in between, mostly
targeting Pakistanis. The trend line is very disturbing, there is no doubt about it. The reaction to the murder of the governor is particularly disturbing, the way the assassin has been applauded in Pakistan instead of him; the way lawyers, who just three years ago led a movement for accountability, seem to be now saying, well, he didn’t break the law, there was no law broken. That is extremely, extremely troubling.

The intimidatory effect is what worries me the most. People like Salman Taseer have gone underground fearing for their lives. Sherry Rehman, who has come to Brookings several times and who is an outspoken defendant of civil liberties, of the rule of law, of the democratic process, has basically, unfortunately, now had to hire bodyguards and make her whereabouts an unknown because of the death threats she’s received.

So I hope that this will not turn out to be the decisive turning point. I think it’s too soon to say, but it is a very, very alarming development.

MR. INDERFURTH: And the security implications of somebody in the elite force?

MR. RIEDEL: Yeah. Associated Press Pakistan reported last week that the assassin had been in the security bodyguard detail for the prime minister or the president 18 times in the last year and had been
the bodyguard for two foreign dignitaries; unidentified as to who those were. If that story is true, and I haven’t seen anyone deny it’s true, it raises the most profound questions about the vetting process. And you can’t help but make the leap: If the vetting process for the security detail around the president and the prime minister allows someone who was well-known to be an outspoken opponent of moderation, then you have to raise the questions about the vetting process in other areas as well.

The good news about Pakistan -- and here I think we have to give General Musharraf credit -- is that he recognized a long time ago that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are the strategic jewel in the crown of Pakistan’s military forces and created an elaborate security system to protect that. The United States has given the benefit of its expertise to Pakistan to further assist them in building the security infrastructure for that. But the weakness in any security infrastructure is always the vetting process of the people involved, and this assassination raises new questions about that vetting process.

MR. INDERFURTH: Mike, I’ve got three more questions and then we’ll go the audience.

MR. O’HANLON: Great.

MR. INDERFURTH: I’m letting you know that you will have your chance, but I rarely get a chance to interrogate my friend, Bruce
Riedel, and I finally get that, so I’m not going to let him go right yet.

Three other questions. One relating to AfPak, which I know don’t like that expression and nor do we, but it became common usage, but there was the Afghanistan-Pakistan annual review by the administration that has just concluded. And in that review the administration said, and this is a quote, “Progress in our relationship with Pakistan over the last year has been substantial, but also uneven.” And then it called special attention to the need for greater cooperation on the denial of safe havens along the border with Afghanistan. If it was a Riedel annual review would you have had similar language or would you have had other things to emphasize in your bottom line?

MR. RIEDEL: I think the strategic review in December got it about right. It was appropriately modest. The progress we’ve seen in Afghanistan I think is important, but fragile and reversible. And frankly, the progress we’ve seen in Pakistan, I think I’ve laid out almost all of it for you already: military operations in seven of eight Federally Administered Tribal Areas; not a lot of progress on building better governance; economic setbacks, some of them the product of the flood, a lot of them the product of just bad politics in Pakistan.

If you look at the Pakistan part of that document what they really say our success in the last two years is we built structure, a strategic
dialogue between Islamabad and Washington. And structure’s important, but, as you well know, when you don’t really have substantive progress to point to when you’re in government, you point to structural progress. It’s a little way of saying the shell game, you know. We really haven’t solved any problems, but we’ve got a committee that’s working on it. I think in that sense it was honest and about right.

MR. INDERFURTH: And keep building.

MR. RIEDEL: And keep building.

MR. INDERFURTH: Okay. Let me ask this question. In your final chapter on helping Pakistan, you go into what can be done for this critical relationship, and you’ve talked about it. I’d like to just focus on one part of this and I’m going to use a quote from Richard Holbrooke, who very tragically and unfortunately is no longer with us to help with this. I will tell you that one thing that I was most impressed about when I read all about Richard Holbrooke, he had made 14 trips to Pakistan during his brief time as the special rep. Very few American officials spend that much time in Pakistan. And when he would go, he would not simply do into the meetings and out to the airport, read his talking points. He would stay, he would engage, he would go out and see people, he’d go places where most people didn’t go. And that kind of commitment was highly commendable.
He said this when he was asked in an interview with Margaret Warner of PBS about what to do about Pakistan. He said, and this is a quote from Richard Holbrooke, “People come up to me and say you have got to tell the Pakistanis that they have to do X or else. Well, the correct answer is, or else what? We have different situations and we have to reconcile them.”

I’d like to ask Bruce if he agrees with that and how do we reconcile when the trust deficit between our two countries is so chasm-like?

MR. RIEDEL: First a word about Richard Holbrooke. I think it’s deeply ironic that he passed at this moment because as I said in my opening remarks I think the moment for diplomacy is ahead of us. The last two years was really a moment for building the inputs into the war in Afghanistan that we’d failed to do for so many years before and building a dialogue with Pakistan. Hopefully, we’re now at the tipping point where we have put those inputs in and we have that dialogue and the diplomacy can really begin and it’s deeply ironic that Richard won’t be able to lead that effort.

I think he’s right in the big picture. We cannot make Pakistan do what we want it to do. When I was in the White House doing the strategic review -- I apologize, some of you may have heard this story
before -- one Friday afternoon I got a phone call from the Oval Office. Will you come over right away? And I thought to myself no good can come of this. Four o’clock on a Friday, the President wants to see you, this is not a good news phone call. He’s not calling you over for tea and crumpets.

And he said to me, Bruce, I’m really, really concerned about Pakistan, and I want you to think outside of the box, not the usual stuff the State Department comes up with about what to do about Pakistan.

I added the State Department line. It’s not true, he didn’t say that. (Laughter)

Think out of the box. So I went back to my office and told my staff we’re going to spend the weekend thinking crazy thoughts and we’re going to consult with a lot of people and ask them what out-of-the-box solutions are there to Pakistan.

One out-of-the-box solution is we could buy them off. What is it that Pakistan wants so badly that if we give it to them, they’ll do anything we want? I asked a lot of people.

For example, how about a civilian nuclear power deal like India has? All the nonproliferation people blanched and said horror of horrors, how could we do that? But when I asked experts what would Pakistan’s reaction be, they all universally said the same thing: Pakistan would say thank you very much. Now you’ve given us what you owed us
and we’re even and we can start over.

   In other words, you got nothing for it other than we’re back to square zero.

   How about money? We could give them billions of dollars in unaccountable funds. Well, the Bush Administration did that, so many billions you can’t find anyone who can tell you how many it was.

   (Laughter) Ten, 12, 15 -- nobody seems to know how many billions we gave them. That didn’t work. So buying them off doesn’t seem to be a solution.

   So let’s think about the alternative. Coercive force, right?

   When you want to make a country do what you want, you use coercive force. We could invade Pakistan. (Laughter) But don’t laugh so loud. We’ve invaded two Muslim countries in the last decade, we could invade a third Muslim country. But your reaction is exactly right, it’s the height of insanity.

   Pakistan has the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal.

   I’ve said it before, I’ll say it again. It has one of the largest armies in the world, a very professional military who will fight and defend their country, who will not give in to coercion.

   And the $64 million question: What would we do with it after we’d invaded it? (Laughter) A country twice the size of California. If
we’ve learned anything in the last decade it ought to be before you invade a country, think about what you’re going to do when you get to the capital and you run the country.

So if you eliminate the extremes -- buying them off, coercion, the out-of-the-box -- you come back to what are basically relatively simple solutions and all of those involve working with Pakistan, not against it. Not trying to create an alliance against Pakistan, but trying to create an alliance with Pakistan.

Now, that dialogue should have red lines in it. There should be behavior which we are clear with Pakistan we won’t tolerate. And there ought to be "or-else"s, very specific "or-else"s. If there are members of the Pakistani Intelligence Service who we believe are involved in international terrorist attacks, we should put them on the U.N.’s list of wanted individuals involved in terrorism. According to David Headley’s interrogation by the Indians and by the Department of Justice, there’s a Major Iqbal out there. Major Iqbal ought to be on the list by the United Nations and by the United States of terrorists we’re looking for, not sanction Pakistan, not sanction the Pakistani army. That’s a real or-else that’s personal and serious, but that ought to be the exception.

The rule ought to be trying to work with Pakistan, including with the Pakistani military. The Pakistani military needs certain things
from us. When I asked one of America’s foremost experts on the
Pakistani army that weekend, what single thing would you do to help
Pakistan more than any other, Shuja Nawaz said helicopters, helicopters, heli
copters. We want the Pakistani army to secure its borders, to fight
insurgency, give it the wherewithal, the helicopters it needs to do it.

Ambassador Haqqani in a little-noted speech about four
months ago said I’ve been ambassador to this country for three years and
my biggest regret is I haven’t gotten more than eight helicopters to show
for it. He zeroed in on that.

These are the kind of practical things we need to do that
would give this dialogue more real pizzazz than it has so far. I’m not being
critical of the administration here. We’ve been building the basis. Now is
the time to put in the diplomacy, the capabilities necessary to make this
relationship work more effectively.

MR. INDERFURTH: The final point I’d like to raise with
Bruce is a prediction for 2011. We’re sort of at the New Year, so I want a
prediction. And I’ll tell you why I’m asking that.

Our friend Michael Krepon at the Stimson Center recently
did a very short piece entitled “A New Year of Familiar Surprises in South
Asia.” And this is what he said about Pakistan. He said, “Pakistan is likely
to remain its current course in 2011, which would mean a further
weakening of national cohesion, governance, and security.” Further weakening. And then he went on to say, “Improvements in national life require improved economic fortunes that depend, in turn, on normal relations with India, a recognition that Pakistan’s military leadership has yet to internalize.”

How do we internalize that? How do we encourage? What can India do? How do you internalize the fact that this neighbor, India, is no longer your existential threat as you saw it for six decades? How is that done?

MR. RIEDEL: First, I agree with everything Michael has said. How is it done? General Kayani was here, the chief of army staff, just two months ago. I wasn’t in the meeting between General Kayani and President Obama, but my understanding is that General Kayani said, in effect -- and these are my words, not his -- you’re not addressing my strategic imperatives. You’re not addressing the issues that matter strategically to me as the chief of army staff of Pakistan.

What I think he was trying to say is India. India, India, India. By his own definition General Kayani has said he is the most India-centric chief of army staff that Pakistan has ever had, and that’s quite a statement to make given some of the chief of army staffs Pakistan has had.

How do we address it? We address it by trying to help
Pakistan and India get back to the back-channel negotiations that they worked on in 2005/2006.

Is it impossible? I don’t think so, and here’s the reason I don’t think it’s impossible. On the Pakistani side, I think President Zardari understands the importance of this. I can’t speak for General Kayani, but I know that General Musharraf included General Kayani in his back-channel negotiations. He was part of the process.

On the Indian side, which is where right now the logjam is -- because it’s the Indians who, quite rightly, in the wake of Mumbai, said how can we trust these people? On the Indian side, we have a prime minister, Manmohan Singh, and a leader of the Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi, who I think understand one critically important fact: A jihadist Pakistan is the globe’s worst nightmare of the 21st century. For Americans it’s a nightmare on the other side of the planet. For Indians it’s a nightmare next door.

A failed or jihadist Pakistan means the hope of a bright, shining India as one of the great countries of the 21st century will never happen. You cannot become the most successful country in the world if your neighbor next door is sick with paralyzing political problems, with terrorism, and is a patron state of terror against you.

The trick is to find a way to get this process moving again,
and I don’t think that trick is beyond the reach of American, Indian, and Pakistani diplomats working on these problems, bringing in assistance from the Chinese, from the Saudis, from the UAE, from the European Union. It’s a big challenge. It’s a big challenge, there’s no doubt about it. But I don’t see any other way that we’re going to help Pakistan help itself and normalize itself in any other way to address General Kayani’s question: What about my strategic imperative?

He asked the question. Let’s help give him the answer.

One last point, Mike Krepon’s right in saying that that’s the trend line. But I want to draw you back to one other thing I said. The Pakistani people have shown a remarkable determination over 60-some years to want what Jinnah promised them: a Pakistan at peace with itself and at peace with its neighbors. That vision of Pakistan has been held onto stubbornly by Pakistanis in the face of enormous challenges for a long time.

And just three or four years ago, the Pakistani people, in a generally peaceful way, overthrew a dictator and brought in democratic elections, probably the most democratic in Pakistani history. I didn’t say they were free and fair. Pakistan’s probably never had a free and fair election. But it got a lot closer in 2008 than it ever has before. So let’s not underestimate the Pakistani people’s desire for a better future,
democracy, and for peace, and let’s not underestimate the Pakistani people.

MR. INDERFURTH: Mike, I’d like to join in those expressions by (inaudible) in support and turn the program back over to you.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you kindly. It was a fascinating conversation, as I’m sure you’ll all agree.

We have microphones, so please wait for one and then identify yourself. We’ll start here on about the fifth row, the gentleman in the blue shirt, please.

MR. HUMPHREY: Peter Humphrey. I’m an intelligence analyst.

Two points. Does Lashkar-e-Taiba actually offer intelligence to the ISI in addition to being sort of the black hand of force?

And two, if per change, by some miracle, Kashmir were to go the way of South Sudan, wouldn’t Pakistani Kashmir delight in departing from Pakistan and joining the new independent Kashmir state?

MR. RIEDEL: The relationship between the ISI and groups like Laskar-e-Taiba is a subject that I’ve spent an enormous amount of time researching and trying to study, and I try to lay out the results in my book. But I’d be the first one to tell you this is a murky area and there are
lies, lies on top of lies. The facts are very, very hard to come by.

The best facts we have are the confession of David Headley, an American citizen who was if not the mastermind for Mumbai, the reconnaissance mastermind for Mumbai. And he paints a picture both in his interrogation with the Indian service, which is now widely available even though it’s supposed to be a secret document, and the American court records, which are available and can be found on the Department of Justice website. It’s actually easier to find the Indian documents than to search through the Department of Justice website, but that’s a separate issue.

He paints a picture of a very intimate relationship. That picture is very consistent with a lot of other material we’ve had over the years, but it’s also not dispositive. David Headley, after all, is a convicted murderer, a convicted terrorist, and we can’t take his word as necessarily authoritative, but I think it’s very illuminating. One of the things he speaks about goes exactly to your question: Do they provide intelligence? Yes, indeed they do, back and forth.

Your second question, I can’t read the minds of Kashmiris. Kashmiris have lived in a hell for the last half-century, where their desires have been suppressed. Most observers, based on anecdotal evidence, would say yes, if Kashmiris were given a choice, they would say a pox on
both your houses, we’d like to be Kashmir. But that’s not going to happen. That’s not in the cards.

The solution that Musharraf and Singh were coming to in the back-channel was a much more realistic solution, in my judgment. And as I understand it, and I interviewed General Musharraf -- Aysha and I interviewed him two years ago -- was, in essence, that the line of control would become the border, but it would become such a permeable border that both sides could claim success. India could say the territorial integrity of India had been respected. Pakistan could say but there is no border anymore; Kashmir is one entity.

One way to think about it is in terms of what has been done in Ireland, where Ulster and Dublin now control most of their issues bilaterally and leave London out of it. More complicated than that obviously, but it’s a rough analogy.

That solution, which creates a permeable border, that allows Kashmiris to go back and forth, is a good solution for India and Pakistan. But above all, it’s a great solution for the Kashmiri people because they get freed from the terror that they’ve lived under for the last 50 years.

MR. O’HANLON: Here in the front row -- or the second row, I’m sorry.

SPEAKER: Ravi (inaudible) at AP. Is it possible to revive
that process which Musharraf (inaudible) with the U.S. help?

MR. RIEDEL: I believe it’s not only possible, I believe it’s imperative. I believe it’s a strategic necessity for the United States to do it. As I said earlier, we’re playing Russian roulette. By my count, we’ve got three or four rounds. There aren’t many left. We keep doing what we’re going to do and we’re going to face a disaster in South Asia.

Now, many people will say it can’t be done. Kashmir’s too hard. India and Pakistan will never negotiate with each other. They may be right, but that takes you nowhere. That’s the strategic road to nowhere. That kind of solution, in effect, means we’re just going to keep playing Russian roulette. So I think we’ve got to raise our sights, do it in a very un-American way. I think that the Secretary of State, not an envoy, not a rep, is the person who really has to do this herself.

MR. O’HANLON: Let’s go over here to Jim Moody in the second row, please.

MR. MOODY: Jim Moody. As someone who goes to Pakistan regularly, starting with my Peace Corps service there years ago, it strikes me that the most -- largest deficit we have is the public opinion about the United States in Pakistan. At the same time, one of the most urgent needs in Pakistan is for educational assistance, 6 through K particularly. Only 40 percent of all children of school age in Pakistan are
even in any school, public or private. It seems to me that one of the most popular things we could do is really help get schooling going. And we could do that at a much lower cost than we could do a lot of other things that are on the list.

The second not unrelated to that is this issue of drone flights over the -- over Pakistan. When I got to Pakistan it’s what they want to talk about the most. Is it really in our interest to do that? If terrorists are, in fact, replaceable at any moment by anyone who gets killed is simply replaced by another, and yet we receive tremendous negative influence from -- or impact and public opinion from these drone flights. You know, in the Tribal Area, as you know and I know, that when you kill my uncle, I have to try to kill you. So not only do we hit Mr. Bad Guy, we may hit 14, 18 other people, injure them or even kill them. Now we have 18 times 3 times 5 times 6 number of people who hate us intensely.

Are these drone flights, given the fact that people are replaceable, are they really on a net-net basis worth it aside from any morality of killing -- of accidental killing? Thank you.

MR. RIEDEL: I counted three questions in there. I’ll start with the first, the trust issue. You’re right, it’s a huge problem. Polling shows that we out-poll India as the bad guy in Pakistan. That’s an extraordinary place to put ourselves in and we’re not going to get out of
that in two years or five years. The Pakistani people have come to the conclusion America’s not reliable for one reason: For 60 years we have been unreliable. Constancy and consistency needs to be the hallmark of our policy.

That gets to the question of capability, and education is exactly one of those places we need to build and help Pakistan build education. An extremely sensitive one. Let’s be frank, most Pakistanis do not want Americans involved in their school system any more than most Americans want Pakistanis involved in our schools. This is -- you’re talking about one of the holy of holies of government, who’s involved in the education system. So in terms of support it has to be done very, very carefully.

This administration was elected on a commitment to triple aid to Pakistan, economic assistance to Pakistan, and it succeeded in doing so through the passage of the Kerry-Lugar legislation. One of my great worries -- you asked my predictions for 2011 -- one of my big worries about 2011 is Kerry-Lugar’s going to be in trouble. I think the mood on Capitol Hill of cut spending is going to look at economic assistance to Pakistan and say here’s 1.5 billion we can cut right now. After all, three countries get economic assistance from the United States: Israel, they’re not going to cut that; Egypt, they may sniggle around with that; and
Pakistan. Pakistan is the most vulnerable.

If you look at the American foreign assistance budget, Pakistan is a big part and I think it’s going to be very vulnerable. It’s going to come under attack from the Tea Party -- and not just the Tea Party, but others -- and the administration’s going to have its hands full trying to keep Kerry-Lugar at the $1.5 billion level it is today, but it should, absolutely, for all the reasons you mentioned.

Drones -- very, very tough question. It’s a real call. This president inherited a situation in which the war in Afghanistan was on the brink of calamitous disaster. The Taliban were on the verge of victory. When I concluded my strategic review I said to the President we are losing the war in Afghanistan, full stop. Losing. In Pakistan we had the situation we’ve described already and we an al-Qaeda that felt virtually no pressure from the United States.

The drones have put pressure on al-Qaeda. The administration is right to say that. I’ll give you one unclassified example, but I think it’s quite meaningful. Al-Qaeda’s number two Ayman al-Zawahiri used to put out a new audio message every other week. I used to call him the Chatty Cathy of international terrorism because he talked about everything. Last year, due to the drones, he put out four messages, two of them were less than 15 seconds in length. His ops tempo has been
disrupted. And that’s a public example. In the secret classified world there are more examples. But all the risks that you identified are there.

This is an extraordinary judgment that has to be made by the President. My caution to him would be don’t become drone-addicted. The drones are a platform. They’re an awesome technological instrument, but they’re not the solution. They have to be part of a much broader strategy and if we become addicted to them, they will ultimately fail us.

We also ought to think seriously about the Pakistani request that they be more involved in the drones. In a sense, right now, Pakistan’s leaders have a lovely outcome. They’re up to here in the drone operations and yet they can claim they have nothing to do with them and that they’re against them. That’s not a good solution for them or for us. If we could turn the drone operations over time to Pakistani hands, that I think would be a much better outcome. We can’t do it today. We don’t have that kind of trust levels. We ought to be hoping that we can get there somewhere down the future.

MR. O’HANLON: On the aisle, about two-thirds of the way back, a woman in the plaid jacket right there. Thanks.

MS. SEROHI: Hi. My name is Sima Serohi. I’m an Indian journalist. You say that Kayani thinks that -- you know, Kayani is one of the most India-centric generals. What do you understand by that? Is he
saying that, you know, India’s about to wage war on Pakistan? Given the history, all of the wars been started by Pakistan, the most recent being in Kargil. So what does this -- I mean, I don’t understand it. Most Indians would say that this is just an excuse for not doing anything.

And if helicopters are the most important things they need, how come the U.S. is giving them, you know, sophisticated things that might be used against India?

The other question’s about Kashmir. Do you think if Kashmir were resolved tomorrow, would -- do you think the Pakistani army would sort of sever its ties with terrorists? And would peace return? Many Indians would not be convinced of that.

MR. RIEDEL: Let me deal with the second question first, Kashmir. Of course not, any more than resolving the status of the West Bank and Gaza and Jerusalem will resolve all the problems of the Middle East. If the bar is what policy solution solves everything, then even Brookings can’t give you an answer. (Laughter)

Would it move in the right direction? Yes, of course it would. Kashmir has been a poison between India and Pakistan for 60 years. I think that’s why Prime Minister Singh tried to find a way to resolve it with Musharraf. It’s not the be-all and end-all. Nothing is. But it’s important.

We don’t have to start with Kashmir either. What I talked
about is let’s build trade routes, let’s open transit routes. You know, you can fly from here to New York every hour on the hour. Well, in theory you can. In reality, when you get to Reagan, usually you can’t, but in theory you can fly every hour. You can’t do that between Delhi and Islamabad. How many flights are there from Delhi to Islamabad a week? A handful. That’s not a healthy situation for two countries.

General Kayani. General Musharraf picked General Kayani in 2008 to be his chief of army staff not so that he would move off into exile in London. He thought General Kayani was going to be able to ensure that he could continue in office. Now, if General Musharraf can’t read General Kayani, I can’t read General Kayani. I don’t pretend to know what he thinks. I’ve met him. I think he’s a sphinx.

He’s not unique. After all, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto handpicked General Zia to be chief of army staff and Nawaz Sharif handpicked Pervez Musharraf to be chief of army staff. My point is trying to read chiefs of army staff, maybe Shuja Nawaz can do it, but I can’t do it, so I don’t try to.

What I’ve heard him say is this is my strategic imperative. It is not secret that India is the obsession that motivates Pakistani army behavior more than anything else. That doesn’t have to be in a good way or a bad way, it’s a reality, so let us deal with that obsession.

Helicopters. I think you were alluding to F-16s, and here I
want to make a policy point. We decided to give Pakistan F-16s back in the Reagan Administration. Pakistan doesn't have advanced attack helicopters. It doesn't have drones. So when they fight the militants in Swat or Waziristan, they use the platform they have, which is an F-16. It's not the optimal platform. When they started doing (inaudible) in Swat, Pakistani pilots were given a photograph taken on the ground of the target and they taped it inside the cockpit, and their mission was go bomb that thing. That's insanity. After Swat, they came -- the Pakistani air force came to us and said we need to have the advanced radar systems and guidance systems to be able to do a proper job.

Now, that was a hard policy decision for the Obama Administration, a very tough policy decision. Because the same radar systems, the same advanced avionics that allow you to attack a target in the Swat Valley will also be perfect for attacking an Indian armored column in the Punjab someday. But these are the kind of real-world decisions that we have to make about Pakistan. I think the Obama Administration did the right thing. It gave them those avionics, which may come back to haunt us someday, but in the real world it was the right decision to make.

MR. O’HANLON: And last question, far back, just the woman -- just two to your right, if you could, please.
SPEAKER: Hi. I'm also a journalist from India. President Hu visits Washington today and the U.S. and China have enough bilateral hurdles and issues to work out over the next two days, but is there any role the China can play to help the U.S. get out of this quagmire they're in in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

MR. RIEDEL: Absolutely. Pakistanis like to say that America treats their country like a tissue: use it and throw it away. They actually have some other examples, but I won’t use those in this audience. (Laughter) When they talk about China, they say China is the all-weather ally, higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the Indian Ocean. China is Pakistan’s most important source of military equipment, conventional and unconventional. They have to be part of this. China is, after all, a party to the Kashmir dispute. It holds part of Kashmir. At least pre-1947 Kashmir is held in Chinese hands.

China’s relationships with both Pakistan and India are shifting in important ways. China no longer sees Pakistan and India as a game in which Pakistan is used as a foil against India. It hasn’t given up that, but it also sees India just like the rest of the world sees it: the economic salvation of mankind in the 21st century is those 500 million Indian middle class who are going to go out and buy something that you want bought in your country.
That new dynamic in the relationship between Islamabad, Beijing, and New Delhi is something we ought to be trying to leverage. It’s part of the big diplomacy that I’m talking about. China needs to be there, Saudi Arabia needs to be there, the United Arab Emirates needs to be there. We got to bring all the players who have an input into the process and all of those who have a stake in its outcome.

MR. O’HANLON: Please join me in congratulating Bruce one more time. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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